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ABSTRACT 
 China’s rise as a space power has coincided with its quest for hegemony in the 
Indo-Pacific. Advances in China’s space capabilities constitute a threat to regional states’ 
national security, economic competitiveness, and national prestige. Accordingly, regional 
space powers have revised their strategies to better compete with China. This thesis 
examines Japan’s, India’s, and Vietnam’s renewed approaches to space power and space 
security amidst China’s rise. Shifts in military, commercial, and civil space policy are 
examined among the selected case studies. This thesis finds that Asian states are 
departing from historical norms by employing militarized space assets to counter the 
security threat from China. They are also allowing the private sector to play a larger role 
in their commercial space industry to improve efficiency, innovative capacity, and 
diplomatic outreach. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation, as well as investments in 
techno-nationalist space-science projects, also supplement the renewed soft-power 
response to Chinese space diplomacy. This thesis presents policy prescriptions for the 
United States to capitalize on the increasing degree of alignment among regional space 
powers’ strategic interests. Recommendations include enhanced military-to-military 
relations, relaxation of commercial restrictions, and increased cooperation in civil space 
to balance against China. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Asian states are growing increasingly concerned over China’s growing space 
capabilities and are devoting renewed attention to their respective space security strategies 
in response. Demonstrations such as China’s 2003 manned Shenzhou V launch and 2007 
anti-satellite (ASAT) test have triggered varying responses from Asian states that perceive 
these growing space capabilities as threats to national security and regional stability. 
Though existing research has delved into how Asian states are individually addressing 
China’s space-related capabilities through internal initiatives, and how states are 
responding to the rise of China in terrestrial-economic and military contexts, a research 
gap lies in comparative analysis of Asian states’ strategic responses to China’s growing 
space power. Accordingly, this thesis aims to address the following question: How have 
Asian states’ space power strategies adapted to China’s rise as a space power? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Space is presently a far more dynamic and anarchic domain than it was throughout 
the Cold War. No longer dominated by just the superpowers’ civil and military programs, 
international space activity is now complemented by an array of emerging commercial and 
military actors, as well as a substantial number of developing states. The rapid increase in 
international space activity following the Cold War has occurred outside of traditional 
cooperative norms, increasing the risk and stakes of space-related conflict.1 The brisk 
introduction of new actors in space, all with unique motivations and interests, challenges 
previous understanding of space power and space security, as states craft strategies that 
account for these post–Cold War shifts. Pursuing more than just military interests, China’s 
space power strategy has particularly responded to these changes, as it has reaped utility 
from civil and commercial space activity while simultaneously achieving national security 
                                                 
1 James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International 
Risks (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 190–91. 
2 
objectives.2 As China continues to employ this multifaceted approach, rival Asian states 
are devising their own counter-strategies to enhance their national security, maintain 
technological parity, remain commercially competitive, and reaffirm their status as a 
regional power.  
While an understanding of Asian states’ space strategies is important for its own 
sake, its implications extend beyond mere description. A holistic evaluation of these 
strategies, assessing their effectiveness in countering China’s rise as a space power, is 
crucial to determining the space-related role the United States could serve in the region. A 
comparison of regional case studies might also provide insight into how similar Asian 
states might respond to China’s growing space capabilities. Additionally, this analysis 
could outline a foundation for increased regional cooperation to foster space security. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Space power theory is a relatively young discipline within national strategy, but as 
nations compete to incorporate space into their security calculations, debates surrounding 
applications of space power have increased in both frequency and significance. Space 
power is widely understood to be a subset of national power and is accordingly subjected 
to its analytical frameworks. Indian space analyst Ajay Lele supports this assessment, 
defining power as “the capability of the state to use the various resources available at its 
command in the pursuit of national objectives.”3 He elaborates that space power is affected 
by and exerts influence over the gamut of national motivations—economic, sociocultural, 
diplomatic, and security—and is subjected to hard and soft characterizations.4 Similarly, 
as with power in a broadly defined sense, Lele argues that defining space power is 
complicated by contextual variations. This analytical link between national power and 
                                                 
2 John J. Klein, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles, and Policy (London: Routledge, 2006), 37; 
Michael Sheehan, The International Politics of Space (London: Routledge, 2007), 160, https://doi.org/
10.4324/9780203933909. 
3 Ajey Lele, “Power Dynamics of India’s Space Program,” Astropolitics 14, no. 2–3 (September 
2016): 121, https://doi.org/10.1080/14777622.2016.1237212. 
4 Lele, 121. 
3 
space power forms the basis of space power theory, but analysis of space power strategy 
and its applications have continuously adapted to shifts in contemporary context. 
While the use of space power has adapted to the context of the time, space power 
has remained an important element in promoting space security and national influence. 
Space power is used to promote space security, which Moltz defines as “the ability to place 
and operate assets outside of the Earth’s atmosphere without external interference, damage, 
or destruction,” similar to how national power helps provide national security.5 He notes 
that in accordance with both the realist and liberal schools of international relations, the 
use of both hard and soft space power have been used in attempts to promote space security, 
particularly in the Cold War. The Cold War experience is illustrative of how space power 
can take on soft and hardline characterizations to fulfill national objectives. The United 
States and Soviet Union most notably fulfilled both liberal and realist expectations of space 
activity during the Cold War by conducting military space operations, engaging in civil 
space competition, and negotiating diplomatic agreements that restricted their competition 
to practices less harmful to the space environment.6  
The dual-use nature of space technology presented a challenge to super power 
strategists throughout the Cold War. As South Asian strategic analyst Sobia Paracha 
explains, “Generally, space technologies include an extensive range of dual-use 
technologies, such as navigation, telemetry, rocketry, satellite set-ups, and also purely 
military technologies, like missiles, [ASAT technology,] and missile defense.”7 As the 
superpowers raced to build intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to deliver nuclear 
warheads across vast distances, the technological similarities between nuclear delivery 
vehicles and civilian launchers proved especially concerning. These developments, 
coupled with advancements in nuclear technology, fueled the infamous deterrence strategy 
                                                 
5 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National 
Interests (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 11, 14–15. 
6 Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 7–16; Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 41,64. 
7 Sobia Paracha, “Military Dimensions of the Indian Space Program,” Astropolitics 11, no. 3 
(September 1, 2013): 157, https://doi.org/10.1080/14777622.2013.842453. 
4 
of mutually assured destruction (MAD).8 Although the superpowers aimed to outpace their 
respective rival’s technological progress in space to promote their own security, there was 
greater utility to be reaped through cooperative means, given the immense costs MAD 
posed.9 
Given this context of MAD, the United States and Soviet Union began to engage 
each other early in the Cold War to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to a high-
stakes nuclear conflict. Soviet-American cooperation yielded many formal agreements that 
limited the military use of space, such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space 
Treaty (OST), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty.10 These agreements helped forge bilateral understanding and respect alongside 
informal practices of information sharing and consultation which helped prevent conflict, 
while also extending the superpowers’ influence across the rest of the world.11 This 
assortment of diplomatic breakthroughs throughout the Cold War represents how the 
diplomatic use of space power achieved mutually desired strategic objectives, promoted 
collective space security, and spread national influence. 
Sheehan affirms this assessment and goes on to cite the United States’ 
announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and cancellation of previous 
cooperative agreements following the détente era as a U.S. return to using hardline space 
power.12 While diplomacy prevailed throughout the détente era, the United States’ 
announcement of the SDI sparked a realist renaissance, reviving fears that the 
aforementioned agreements had aimed to contain.13 While SDI never came to be, the 
announcement of a space-based weapons system that was intended to disrupt the Soviet 
Union’s nuclear weapons strategy is a noteworthy example of how military-based space 
                                                 
8 Wilson Wong and James Fergusson, Military Space Power (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 5. 
9 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 15–16. 
10 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 174. 
11 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 2012, 16.  
12 Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 55–66.  
13 Sheehan, 66.  
5 
power aimed to promote unilateral space security, albeit at the expense of preexisting 
diplomatic treaties. Although cooperation in space between the superpowers resumed soon 
after, and even expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union,14 hardline use of space 
power came became increasingly present in space strategy discourse throughout the era of 
U.S. unipolarity.  
At the end of the Cold War, debate surrounding the effectiveness of military-
strategic doctrines to promote space security continued. As the United States went 
unchallenged as the dominant space actor, some American military analysts and realist 
scholars envisioned space as the inevitable next frontier for warfare. They accordingly 
advocated for military dominance of the space domain, aiming to capitalize on the absence 
of meaningful opposition to U.S. space power. David Lupton, an officer in the U.S. Air 
Force, asserted that space power is analogous to that of sea power, air power, and land 
power in military strategy and evolved from these earlier sets of domain-tactical beliefs.15 
Lupton perceived a mutual objective of establishing control of the warfare environment in 
terrestrial and space doctrines, favoring weaponized approaches over liberal alternatives. 
Weaponization is considered the stationing or use of weapons in or from space either 
offensively or defensively, while militarization is generally understood as the use of space-
derived information in support of terrestrial operations.16 Although his work preceded the 
end of the Cold War, Lupton’s doctrine influenced later scholars such as Mantz, who 
advocates for an even more aggressive, weaponized space power theory based upon space-
strike, space-protection, and space-denial missions.17  
Everett Dolman, an associate professor at the School of Advanced Airpower 
Studies, argued that weaponized space doctrines such as Lupton’s and Mantz’s were the 
                                                 
14 Sheehan, 179; “NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War,” NASA, 
accessed August 25, 2018, https://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/coldWarCoOp.html. 
15 David E. Lupton, “On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine” (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: 
Air University Press ; 1988), 4. 
16 Raja Qaiser Ahmed and Misbah Arif, “Space Militarization in South Asia: India’s Quest for Space 
Weapons and Implications for Pakistan,” Asian Survey 57, no. 5 (October 1, 2017): 814, https://doi.org/
10.1525/as.2017.57.5.813. 
17 Michael Mantz, The New Sword: A Theory of Combat Space Power (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 
Airpower Research Institute, May 1995), 37, 46, 51. 
6 
gateway to a secure and prosperous space environment in the absence of a governing space 
authority. Dolman formulated a strategy called “astropolitik,” based upon the concept of 
realpolitik,18 and envisioned the “application of the prominent and refined realist vision of 
state competition into outer space policy.”19 Dolman claims that the United States should 
monopolize military space power—establishing space control in Lupton’s terminology—
to replace the present anarchic order of space, allowing the United States to serve as the 
ultimate governing authority beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. 
By establishing military dominance of space through weaponized means, Dolman 
argues the United States could prevent an authoritarian state from doing so and creating an 
illiberal space order. Dolman also claims that U.S. space dominance would benefit the 
international community by serving as the benign space authority and enforcing a liberal 
space order. Such military-strategic applications of space power have become increasingly 
controversial. Sheehan argues that such thinking only advances the realist “self-fulfilling 
prophecy”20 and French space analyst Alain Dupas believes astropolitik-style 
weaponization deters potential commercial investors, hindering commercial space 
development instead of promoting it.21  
Despite their former salience, hardline strategies for applying space power no 
longer represent the only lens through which to analyze it. Changes in international space 
activity following the Cold War have stimulated updated doctrines and space strategies for 
nations to remain competitive in twenty-first-century space. The dominance of commercial 
space activity, increased military dependency on space assets as force multipliers, reduced 
threat of nuclear war, and the introduction of many new spacefaring nations all represent 
post-Cold War shifts in space activity that complicate Cold War–era frameworks in the 
                                                 
18 Realpolitik translates to “political realism” from German and is attributed to Ludwig von Rochau; 
G.R. Berridge and Lorna Lloyd, “Realpolitik,” in The Palgrave Macmillian Dictionary of Diplomacy, 3rd 
ed. (London: Macmillian Publishers Ltd., 2012). 
19 Everett Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (Portland, OR: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2002), 1. 
20 Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 11.  
21 Alain Dupas, “Commercial-Led Options” in James Clay Moltz, Future Security in Space : 
Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International 
Studies, 2002). 
7 
present context. The rapid growth of the international space economy is especially 
noteworthy, having almost doubled from $176.7 billion to $330 billion in total valuation 
from 2005–2014.22 This figure is remarkable considering the devastation wrought on the 
global economy during the Great Recession. Additionally, international commercial space 
activity represented 76 percent of this figure, eclipsing global civil and military spending 
by a factor of three.23 The commercial space sector is also playing a large role in innovation 
formerly led by civil programs in countries such as in the United States; the rise of 
commercial space innovation could offer more cost-effective and timely developments 
than state-led initiatives, representing another post-Cold War shift with significant 
implications for national space power.24 
Although some military space power doctrines take notice of the increase of non-
state interests in space and the interaction between the space and terrestrial environments,25 
options that do not enhance the risk of conflict exist. These alternatives involve an 
emphasis on the use of soft space power to establish liberal practices of cooperation and 
self-restraint. Soft space power is based on a “mechanism for attraction,” a concept which 
is based upon influencing other countries through foreign policy to share common interests 
they otherwise would not have.26 States most commonly utilize their civil and commercial 
space programs to exert this influence by leveraging their technological prowess to arrange 
cooperative agreements or commercial arrangements.  
Civil space programs contribute to national space power and international 
cooperation by promoting scientific research, technological development, and national 
prominence on the world stage. While civil space programs have been criticized for 
potentially contributing to military capabilities under a peaceful guise, given the dual-use 
                                                 
22 The Space Foundation, “The Space Report 2015: The Authoritative Guide to Global Space 
Activity” (Colorado Springs, Colorado: Space Foundation, 2015), 14. 
23 The Space Foundation, 2. 
24 James Clay Moltz, “From Nations to Networks: The Changing Dynamics of Twenty-First Century 
Space Power,” Strategic Studies Quarterly March 2019, 80. 
25 Klein, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles, and Policy, 38.  
26 Ajey Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? (India: Springer, India, 2013), 219–34. 
8 
nature of space technology, there are undeniable positive externalities from civil space 
projects. Civil space projects such as the U.S. Apollo program spurred leaps in both 
scientific research and technical capacity while also contributing to American “techno-
nationalism.”27 The success of such missions promoted the image of U.S technological 
leadership over that of the Soviet Union, contributing to the legitimacy of the United States’ 
ideology over the Soviet Union’s amidst their Cold War competition.28 Achievements in 
civil space activity promote a heightened sense of legitimacy over rival states, as evident 
in the Cold War experience, and help facilitate cooperation with states impressed or 
concerned by these technological demonstrations.  
Commercial space programs also serve as agents of soft space power, but the 
security implications of commercial activity must also be acknowledged. In general, the 
use of economic space power is flexible because it can be leveraged to attain either 
diplomatic or security-related outcomes. Trade restrictions advance realist expectations of 
inter-state competition and aim to enhance space security by weakening potential 
adversaries; however, efforts to remove such barriers and promote amicable relations 
enhance soft power by creating diplomatic capital, potentially opening doors for 
cooperation in other areas. The United States lifted restrictions of sensitive technology 
transfers to India in 2018, granting it Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-1), in a show of 
soft power as part of a larger effort to establish amicable relations and balance against 
China.29 While there are obvious hardline security implications of expanded strategic trade 
between the United States and India, it is important to note that United States is not 
coercing India to take any specific course of action by granting it STA-1 status. Instead, 
the United States hopes to influence India’s decision to balance against China by 
establishing strategic trade relations. 
                                                 
27 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 11. 
28 John Logsdon, “Why Space Exploration Should Be A Global Project,” Space Policy 24, no. 1 
(February 2008): 3. 
29 Ankit Panda, “Strategic Trade Authorization: A Fillip for India’s ‘Major Defense Partner’ Status 
with the US,” Diplomat, August 1, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/strategic-trade-authorization-a-
filip-for-indias-major-defense-partner-status-with-the-us/. 
9 
China’s multifaceted space power strategy utilizes economic, diplomatic, and 
security-related elements of space power to enhance national space security. China aims to 
develop a competitive, holistic space program that can enhance relationships with 
developing states, limit the influence of other space powers, and use dual-use technology 
to efficiently advance its military capabilities. China’s increasing ability to produce dual-
use technology reinforces its military strategy by seeking asymmetric advantages over 
conventionally superior adversaries like the United States, and could pose a challenge to 
potential American intervention in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait.30 These points 
illustrate how China is using its military-space sector to undermine its potential adversary, 
the United States, by developing advanced dual-use technology; however, China’s space 
strategy utilizes its space sector for more than just military utility. 
China accrues diplomatic capital from heavily subsidized sales of satellites, ground 
systems, and launches to foreign countries, enhancing the soft power elements of its space 
strategy. China markets space technology through the Great Wall Industry Corporation 
(GWIC) to developing states not only to develop a profitable presence in emerging markets 
and reinforce its desired image as a peaceful power, but also to extend its influence as a 
space power in areas that traditionally favored the United States.31 China’s diplomatic 
space strategy is set to benefit tremendously from the inclusion of the Spatial Information 
Corridor (SIC) as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). SIC will offer 65 countries 
partaking in BRI services from Chinese space assets.32 According to the China National 
Space Administration (CNSA), SIC will provide access to “remote sensing, 
communications and broadcasting, the Beidou satellite navigation system, as well as 
satellite positioning services for applications including telemedicine, disaster relief, 
                                                 
30 Matthew John Dillon, “Implications of the Chinese Anti-Satellite Test for the United States Navy 
Surface Forces” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 6.  
31 Rob W. Chambers, “China’s Space Program a New Tool for PRC ‘Soft Power’ in International 
Relations?,” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 144; Moltz, “From Nations to Networks,” 
77. 
32 Jiang Hui, “The Spatial Information Corridor Contributes to UNISPACE+50,” United Nations 
Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2018, http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/stsc/2018/tech-
08E.pdf.  
10 
transport, entertainment and counter-terrorism.”33 SIC also aims to promote cooperation 
in space science, applications, and space exploration.34 Although the United States has 
maintained its status as the dominant space power, China’s space strategy poses a 
significant challenge to the United States’ strategic ambitions. The diplomatic capital 
accrued from China’s space-related ventures abroad, such as SIC, could allow it to establish 
cooperative agreements and norms of space activity instead of the United States, enhancing 
China’s space security by becoming a more dominant diplomatic power in space-related 
issues.  
Equally important to China’s space strategy is the role of its civil space program. 
China has established itself as a space power in the eyes of many as a result of its civil 
space achievements, ranging from the 2003 Shenzhou V manned space launch to its 
Chang’e 1 lunar probe mission in 2008,35 as well as ongoing plans to launch an upgraded, 
large space station in 2022.36 In both the civil and military space sectors, such 
demonstrations of advanced indigenous technology aim not only to promote China’s 
national status, but also to reinforce China’s tech-driven economic initiatives like Made in 
China 2025. This program aims to overcome the middle income trap by developing high 
end domestic manufacturing capabilities and decrease China’s reliance on technology from 
abroad.37 The plan also emphasizes the production of civil space equipment, eyeing 80% 
domestic capacity by 2025.38 
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China is establishing itself as a holistic space power much more quickly than its 
regional rivals, forcing them to revamp their space strategies in light of the Chinese threat. 
India, Japan, and Vietnam have watched China’s space strategy unfold much to their peril, 
as China’s comprehensive approach to space power threatens their regional prominence 
and ambitions. India’s space strategy also aims to exploit dual-use technology in pursuit of 
national security, relying on indigenous civilian launch vehicle technology as it enhances 
its satellite programs for military applications.39 India has also improved the range of its 
nuclear missiles using technology like that in its civilian launch vehicles.40  
Additionally, India’s revised comprehensive space strategy aims to counter 
growing Chinese influence across the Indo-Pacific, particularly in countries which 
comprise the String of Pearls that geographically constrains India. Lele argues developing 
space powers will “fall more on India because of its space infrastructure and economical 
commercial launching facilities.”41 In this context, the soft power relationship between 
India’s civil program and its diplomatic aims is similar to China’s military-driven space 
strategy, as the rival states both aim to extend their influence as technological leaders across 
the developing world. India’s space exploration missions, such as its 2014 Mars probe 
mission, enhance its image as a technological leader among developing nations while also 
stoking techno-nationalist sentiments. Furthermore, India’s space program contributes to 
larger national economic initiatives such as the “Make in India” and “Digital India” efforts 
meant to improve domestic manufacturing capability and facilitate the transition to an 
innovation-based economy.42  
According to space analyst and professor Saadia Pekkanen, Japan has shifted its 
space strategy’s focus from solely market and scientific research purposes to increasingly 
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allow for security applications.43 She explains how, following a series of commercial 
failures throughout the 1990s, Japan’s commercial space industry found safe haven from 
superior international competition in a mutually beneficial relationship with Japan’s 
security bureaucracy. Following a 2008 piece of legislation that allowed military space 
activity, the Basic Space Law, Japanese commercial space firms earned contracts from 
Japan’s security sector that allowed them to remain in business while developing dual-use 
technology to protect against threats from China and North Korea.44 Pekkanen concludes 
that this strategic shift has allowed Japan to pursue a multifaceted space strategy in 
response to China’s by allowing existing commercial industries to serve a space-related 
military-industrial complex, efficiently promoting national security and economic 
development. 
Vietnam has adopted a primarily development-oriented space strategy. Making use 
of increased economic power following market reforms in the mid-1980s, Vietnam began 
investing in indigenous space capabilities to achieve “orbital sovereignty,” promote 
international prestige,  and become less dependent on other space powers.45 Despite this 
aim and Vietnam’s investment in indigenous space technology and infrastructure, it still 
embraces cooperation with external space powers.46 This trend illustrates Vietnam’s desire 
to leverage its space program for diplomatic and security purposes in addition to 
socioeconomic development. States such as Vietnam are often the targets of larger space 
powers’ soft power strategies, such as Japan’s. Japan has contributed a considerable 
amount of financial assistance to Vietnam in its quest to establish a highly-capable space 
program.47 Despite Vietnam’s ambitions to develop indigenous space capabilities, it 
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benefits from foreign technology and capacity-building efforts offered by larger space 
powers like Japan in pursuit of shared geopolitical objectives.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
As previously mentioned, Moltz notes that lack of cooperative norms among Asia’s 
major space powers is fueling an increased risk of conflict. The absence of a stabilizing 
regional framework implies that Asian states are not using diplomatic space power to 
ensure collective space security in the wake of increased Chinese space activity. However, 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in commercial and security fields are possible 
responses to China’s space power and could fall under commonly cited responses to rising 
powers.  
If Asian states are arming themselves with militarized space equipment, 
cooperating bilaterally, or working multilaterally to promote space security, their actions 
will largely fall under one of three possible larger trends in accordance with balance of 
power theory: balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging. Balancing can occur both internally 
and externally, as internal balancing entails a state unilaterally redirecting its resources 
towards countering a potential threat, while external balancing requires cooperation with 
other states. Asian states would be externally balancing against China if they are 
collectively working together, or with extra-regional powers like the United States, to 
promote mutual space security. Despite these states sharing a common interest in 
responding to China’s space power, they are also concerned about attaining relative gains 
in space power over each other, reflecting a headwind against some kinds of regional 
multilateral cooperation.48 While external balancing against China is a plausible 
explanation of Asian state behavior, the incentive for them to balance must outweigh these 
incentives to compete among each other. This decision will depend largely on a case-by-
case basis, as states without bilateral rivalries face different sets of strategic calculations 
than those with hostile relations when deciding whether to balance against a third power.  
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Conversely, Asian states would be bandwagoning with China if they were 
accepting China’s power by collaborating with China in diplomatic, economic, and security 
related fields; this explains behavior like Pakistan’s. Hedging would occur if Asian states 
are engaging in a balance of cooperation among China and other powerful states like the 
U.S. or Japan. Hedging is increasingly considered a common behavior for states close with 
both the United States and China. This trend is often posited as a choice to rely on China 
for economic purposes and the United States for political and security related assistance, 
and explains behavior of many Southeast Asian states such as Thailand and Indonesia. 
Given the generally warm relations shared among Japan, India, and Vietnam, as well as 
their respective rivalries with China, it can be reasonably hypothesized that these three 
states are balancing against China. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will utilize a series of comparative case studies to determine how Asian 
states are responding to China’s growing space power, analyzing India’s, Japan’s, and 
Vietnam’s space strategies. To determine regional behavior in response to China, 
comparative analysis must be emphasized over a single case study. Research will primarily 
be qualitative, as open source quantitative figures surrounding ongoing space-related 
security projects are scarce; however, publicly disclosed figures such as budgets and launch 
statistics will be incorporated throughout the analysis.  
The three case study countries have been chosen because of their history as space-
faring states and their rivalries with China. Status as a space-faring state is necessary for 
selection as a case study, as states without functioning space programs lack the means 
necessary to directly counter China’s space capabilities. Similarly, each case study must 
have the strategic motivations to compete with China’s growing space power, considering 
it a threat to their national security or regional prominence, to be considered in competition 
with China.  
Research materials will primarily consist of open source, scholarly works, 
including journal articles and books from academic publishers; however, information 
surrounding the most recent space related developments will be found in academic 
15 
databases, reliable news sources, and organizational public releases. Official government 
press releases, statistics, and reports will be also incorporated. For the most recent 
developments specific to the case studies, the use of reputable press and organizational 
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II. INDIA 
In a remarkably transformative process, India has joined the ranks of the world’s 
major space powers since its humble beginnings in the mid-twentieth century. Unlike the 
superpowers of the Cold War, whose economic development preceded the establishment 
of costly multifaceted space programs, India sought to promote socioeconomic 
development through investment in civil-oriented space technology. This peaceful model, 
though not without its advantages, has since 2007 been cast aside in favor of a system better 
suited for competition with other space-faring nations in the region, namely China.  
The Sino-Indian rivalry has historically covered a spread of issues ranging from 
border disputes to clashing regional ambitions, mutual suspicion over military 
modernization, economic competition, and technological disparities. This competition has 
naturally spilled over to the space domain. Amidst China’s rise, India aims to counter 
China’s holistic space strategy by enhancing its space program to embrace commercial 
competitiveness, promote national security, support national technological initiatives, and 
foster strong relationships with both regional and extra-regional partners, including the 
United States. This chapter will analyze examine how India has altered its space strategy 
to counter China’s rise as a space power. India’s history in space will be discussed first, 
followed by its shifts in New Delhi’s strategic approach to the military, commercial, and 
civil space domains in the current geopolitical climate. The conclusion will summarize the 
chapter’s findings. 
A. HISTORY OF INDIA’S SPACE PROGRAM 
India’s space program has traditionally refrained from dwelling on security 
applications. Electing instead to pursue civilian utility, India sought to utilize a space 
program to promote development through technological advancement.49 Following 
independence, Indian leadership optimistically perceived a fruitful relationship between 
science and development, hailing technology as the path towards international cooperation 
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and progress.50 However, such ambitions would not come to fruition in the space domain 
until the formation of the Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) in 
1962.51 India’s first experiments with rocketry occurred this same year at the Thumba 
Equatorial Rocket Launching Center (TERLS), where the Soviet Union launched rockets 
following an agreement with the Indian government.52 TERLS, which became the primary 
site for India’s earliest space experiments, also launched Nike-Apache sounding rockets 
provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) with French 
payloads.53  
INCOSPAR was a part of the Department of Atomic Energy and was succeeded by 
the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in 1969. The space mission was then 
separated from the atomic in 1972 with the founding of the Space Commission and the 
Department of Space, and the split simultaneously moved ISRO into the newly created 
administrative organization.54 These agencies collectively facilitated many of India’s 
earliest space projects, ranging from receiving stations to space launch vehicles, and 
benefitted highly from partnerships with space programs from both of the competing Cold 
War blocs. These international partnerships across the ideological spectrum not only 
established a working rapport between ISRO and the world’s developed space powers, but 
also facilitated ISRO’s gradual rise to major space power status as part of India’s strategy 
of non-alignment.  
ISRO was able to successfully play off the Soviet and Western space programs to 
bolster its technical expertise. In the mid-1970s, India worked with the United States to 
secure remote sensing data from NASA and learn how to apply it for development-related 
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purposes.55 ISRO and NASA then collaborated on a telecommunications project which 
broadcast educational television programs to rural villages across India, another early 
example of India’s development minded space projects.56 Simultaneously, the Soviet 
Union launched India’s first satellite, the research satellite Aryabhata, in 1975.57 
Applications-based projects such as these collectively promoted India’s development as 
envisioned by the nation’s independence leaders, and were the primary focus of the Indian 
space program in its earliest years. Nonetheless, India’s space program, which relied on 
launch services from abroad, lagged behind China’s, which had independently launched its 
first satellite five years earlier, in 1970.58  
India’s international cooperation continued even after 1974, when India tested its 
first nuclear device. India established a joint commission to facilitate cooperative projects 
with the French National Center for Space Studies (CNES) this same year. According to 
Indian space analyst B.R. Guruprasad, the most notable project to result from this Joint 
Commission was the Viking rocket engine, an incomplete system transferred from France 
to India to be completed together.59 Between 1974 and 1978, ISRO devoted over 100 man 
years of labor to complete the Viking engine with CNES, providing India with a liquid-
fueled propulsion system and technical experience.60 Meanwhile, India also worked 
alongside the United States to develop its first launch vehicle: the SLV-3.61 Though 
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intended for civilian use, the United States grew wary of India’s advancements in launch 
vehicle technology, fearing it could eventually develop a delivery system for its nuclear 
weapons.  
U.S. concerns over potential nuclear delivery vehicles in the late 1970s marked the 
decline of NASA’s cooperation with India and India’s increased cooperation with the 
USSR and the European Space Agency (ESA).62 During the Ariane launch vehicle’s third 
flight in 1981, ISRO was able to launch its APPLE experimental communications satellite 
at no cost, representing the ongoing solidarity between India and its allies at ESA despite 
cooling relations with the United States.63 Although the United States launched the first 
two satellites of India’s INSAT communications series, INSAT 1-A and INSAT 1-B, in 1982 
and 1983 following these developments,64 India’s cooperation with the Soviet Union and 
ESA yielded more productive outcomes given the stability of their relationship amidst 
India’s growing interest in a missile program. 
In 1983, India established the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program 
(IGMDP) in response to a tighter missile-technology control regime led by Western 
powers.65  The IGMDP oversaw India’s five primary missile projects, including the Prithvi 
and Agni programs,66 and repurposed technology from its civilian launch program.67 The 
development of India’s first nuclear-tipped missile, the mobile Prithvi I, began in 1983.68 
The Prithvi I was unable to reach the Chinese coastline given the constraints posed by its 
short range,69 implying that the missile was developed more as a  response to the threat 
from neighboring Pakistan than that from China. India later tested the Agni ballistic missile 
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using technology from the SLV-3,70 demonstrating the nation’s determination to promote 
its strategic deterrence capabilities despite Western concerns. 
ISRO and the USSR grew even closer throughout the remaining years of the Cold 
War. The USSR launched India’s first astronaut, Rakesh Sharma, in April 1984 aboard the 
Soyuz T11 spacecraft.71 Furthermore, in 1988, the Soviet Union launched India’s first 
remote-sensing satellite, IRS-1A, a milestone for India’s goal of indigenous development.72 
However, the end of the Cold War presented new challenges for the Indian space program 
which complicated its launch vehicle and nuclear missile related ambitions. Although India 
had made significant strides toward independent capabilities by the late 1980s, the U.S. led 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) limited India’s ability to acquire missile-
related technology from Russia. In 1991, India and the Russian commercial space company 
Glavkosmos reached an agreement that would have provided India with the cryogenic 
technology needed for its own heavy launchers.73 However, the United States felt this 
agreement violated the MTCR, resulting in U.S. sanctions against Glavkosmos.74 Despite 
Russia’s assurances to India that it would not cave in to American protests, Yeltsin 
eventually complied with MTCR guidelines, and Glavkosmos agreed to sell only fully 
manufactured boosters to India instead of the manufacturing hardware to produce its 
own.75 
India’s socialist-planned economy also faced significant challenges by the end of 
the 20th century, prompting interest in commercial space to reignite India’s economic 
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engine.76 In 1992, the Antrix Corporation was stood up as a corporate division of ISRO to 
oversee the “commercial exploitation of space products, technical consultancy services and 
transfer of technologies developed by ISRO.”77 In addition to marketing ISRO services, 
Antrix was also responsible for promoting space-related industries across India to help 
reinvigorate the economy.78 Throughout the early 1990s, the Augmented Space Launch 
Vehicle (ASLV), a launcher derived from the previously mentioned SLV-3, completed its 
last successful tests, paving the way for the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV).79 The 
PSLV would go on to become the hallmark of India’s launch service program, launching 
an array of ISRO projects into the new millennium.80 In 1993, India began to launch 
satellites for its expanding Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) constellation on the PSLV, 
including the first ocean observation satellite Oceansat in 1999.81 The first PSLV 
commercial launch occurred the same year, launching the South Korean Kitsat-3 and 
German Tubsat.82 Although the ALSV and PSLV demonstrated improvements in 
indigenous Indian space technology, as they were generally unaffected by the cryogenic 
episode, India continued to rely on international partners for technical capacity at the 
highest stages. The first successful launch of the Geostationary Launch Vehicle (GSLV) in 
2001 marked India’s step toward independent capacity in the heavy launch sector.83 
However, the GSLV used a Russian-built upper stage engine since ISRO had yet to develop 
its own cryogenic capability.84 Nonetheless, until India could successfully master its own 
cryogenic potential, its heaviest launch programs would continue to struggle. 
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Simultaneously, as China’s advancements in space technology grew more 
worrisome, India began utilizing more of its space-related expertise to improve the quality 
of its strategic deterrent by commencing work on the Prithvi III, and Agni series missiles. 
Improvements from the Prithvi I and Prithvi II missiles include a second-stage booster and 
solid-fuel propulsion system, representing an increase in the application of formerly 
civilian technology to counter China’s rising threat.85 The Agni project, originally an 
experimental demonstrator under the IGMPD, then became an operational program, 
producing the Agni I and Agni II missiles.86 Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Kargil 
War, India began planning a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system to counter the missile 
threat from Pakistan.87  
India’s history as a space faring nation can be best characterized by its ability to 
play off the rival blocs of the Cold War to enhance its own capabilities, a common tactic 
of non-aligned countries throughout the ideological struggle. By working with NASA, 
ESA, and the Soviet Union, ISRO was able to rapidly attain advanced technologies and 
expertise while promoting its own development and strategic posture. India’s doctrine of 
strategic autonomy governs its activity in other fields as well, and despite a current drift 
towards alignment with the United States, the doctrine continues to guide India’s national-
level strategy and its space power strategy.88 Throughout the early decades of the new 
millennium, India has continued to exploit its self-proclaimed strategy of non-alignment to 
optimize its strategic opportunities, reaping the benefits of collaboration, while 
demonstrating its own space-related capabilities to promote techno-nationalism. Analysis 
of India’s space militarization, the commercial space industry, and advancements in civil 
space support this assessment and provide valuable insight into how India is responding to 
China’s achievements in space. 
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B. CONTEMPORARY SHIFTS IN SPACE STRATEGY 
1. Military 
Though India is not at the center of Chinese strategists’ concerns, India considers 
China a primary threat, and relations between the two states therefore remain complex and 
often strained. While China’s advancements in space and military technology worried India 
prior to 2007, China’s ASAT launch particularly threatened India, as it symbolized the 
growing gap between Chinese and Indian technological progress and India’s need to 
reevaluate its space security strategy.89 Given the largely civilian nature of India’s space 
program since its origin, India needed to rework its space policy to emphasize security 
applications. While the development of India’s nuclear missile arsenal has benefitted from 
civilian space technology for decades, India’s experiments with conventional military 
space platforms are a relatively recent development. The repurposing of India’s civilian 
space capabilities has enhanced the lethality of its fighting forces primarily by fulfilling 
force enhancement and support roles. India’s recent achievements in military space 
culminated with the launch of its first ASAT weapon, representing a national shift toward 
the weaponization of space. 
As previously mentioned, China’s ASAT test in 2007 was one of the first major 
catalysts for the militarization of the Indian space program. In the aftermath of this 
demonstration, India began reorganizing its bureaucracy to prepare for military space 
operations. One such shift came under the Defense Space Vision 2020 which aimed to 
enhance satellite capabilities across the armed forces under the Integrated Space Cell 
(ISC).90 According to Indian security analyst Rajeswari Rajogopalan at the Observer 
Research Foundation, this cell was placed under the Integrated Defense Staff in 2008 “so 
that [ISRO, the Department of Space, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the military] talk 
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to each other about requirements, capabilities, and relevant policy.”91 Intra-organizational 
coordination under the ISC has facilitated India’s militarization of space, providing the 
Indian military with an array of new capabilities. 
Given India’s history of border disputes with its rivals China and Pakistan, India 
sought to utilize military-dedicated satellites to monitor contested areas and enhance force 
readiness. Thus, India’s first experiments with militarized space assets specifically 
emphasized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. However, the 
degree to which India’s space program was militarizing was unclear during this time. 
Although India launched a couple of observation satellites in the early 2000s which could 
have served both the military and civilian sector, Cartosat-2A, launched in 2008, was the 
first satellite widely speculated to be dedicated to the Indian military due to its precise 
resolution.92 Nonetheless, ISRO maintained that the satellite was dedicated to civilian 
missions.93 India’s arrangement with Israel to acquire RISAT-1 and RISAT-2 also raised 
questions about the stated-civilian intentions of India’s space program, as these radar 
imaging satellites were based on Israel’s TecSAR reconnaissance satellites.94  
Once again, however, the ambiguity of dual-use technology hindered accurate 
assessments surrounding India’s military space capabilities.95 As China’s regional 
ambitions continued to grow, India’s military space strategy did as well. By the early 
2010s, China’s regional power projection strategy looked more towards the Persian Gulf 
through the Indian Ocean, Pakistan in South Asia, and the Straits of Malacca in Southeast 
Asia. China’s strategy expanded to geographically surround the Indian subcontinent with 
sympathetic—or debt loaded—governments and military assets, forming the String of 
Pearls and spurring India’s fears of containment.  
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Accordingly, India began to invest in solely military-dedicated force enhancing 
satellites, offering improved communication, ISR, and navigation capabilities to 
conventional Indian forces. India launched GSAT-7 in 2013, the first Indian satellite 
officially recognized for military use.96 The designation of GSAT-7, India’s first military-
dedicated satellite, as a naval asset strongly suggests that India fully intends to utilize its 
military space assets to support conventional conflicts where it deems them most critical, 
given the increased attention to the maritime domain. According to an official press release, 
the Indian Navy proclaims the satellite will “cover an area spread from Persian Gulf to 
Malacca Strait and will thus cover an area equivalent to almost 70% of the IOR [Indian 
Ocean Region].”97 Similarly, the air force support satellite launched in 2018, GSAT 7-A, 
represents yet another element of India’s transition from a ground combat-oriented military 
to counter China’s regional power projection.98 India’s only joint command operates on 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, territories positioned to the west of the Strait of 
Malacca,99 and will especially benefit from the increased communications ability offered 
by India’s military space satellites. The Cartosat constellation grew rapidly during this 
time, totaling 6 spacecraft at the end of 2018.100  
As of early April 2019, the only other purely military-dedicated satellites within the 
Indian Armed Forces are the communications satellite GSAT-6, and the electronic 
intelligence satellite EMISAT.101  India plans to rapidly increase the scale of its military 
space program and launch more satellites with military potential. In addition to Cartosat-
                                                 
96 Rahul Bedi and James Hardy, “India’s First Dedicated Military Satellite Launched,” Jane’s by IHS 
Markit, August 30, 2013, https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/jdw53124-jni-2013. 
97 “Navy Gets a Boost with Launch of First Dedicated Defence Satellite,” Indian Navy, accessed 
August 22, 2018, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/navy-gets-boost-launch-first-dedicated-defence-
satellite. 
98 Lele, “GSAT-7A and India’s Growing Military Space Needs.” 
99 “ARMED FORCES,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, accessed August 29, 2018, https://janes-ihs-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/indis100-sas. 
100 Lele, “GSAT-7A and India’s Growing Military Space Needs.” 
101 “India Launches Latest Military Comms Satellite,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, accessed August 20, 
2018, https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/jdw59600-jdw-2015; Madhumathi D.S., “India 
Gets Surveillance Satellite,” Hindu, April 1, 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/pslv-
isro-emisat-launch-from-sriharikota-on-april-1/article26699077.ece. 
27 
3 and four radar imaging RISAT class satellites, ISRO also plans to introduce two new 
GISAT class imaging satellites by the end of 2019.102 Given that the previous RISAT and 
Cartosat class satellites were utilized for civilian service as well, it can be reasonably 
deduced from ISRO’s projected launch schedule that India will continue to utilize dual-
purpose space assets alongside purely military spacecraft in support of national security. 
India also desires to break away from dependence on the American Global 
Positioning System (GPS), having formed the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System 
(IRNSS), a follow-up to the GPS-assisted GAGAN system devoted to civil aviation.103 
While not providing full global coverage, and also shared by the military and commercial 
sectors, the IRNSS will provide independent navigational support for India’s armed forces, 
especially in the context of its expanding its maritime presence across the IOR. Having 
recently signed an agreement with the Seychelles to maintain a military base in the 
archipelagic nation, the IRNSS will allow the Indian Navy to effectively operate in new 
sectors of the IOR and meaningfully counter China’s growing maritime presence.104 
India’s growing attention to the military utility of force-enhancing satellites complements 
its growing regional presence well and is conducive with its overall balancing effort against 
China. 
India has also made significant organizational developments in space which have 
guided the employment of space assets within a joint framework. India has made steps 
towards a formal doctrine which incorporates space into joint operations, publishing the 
Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces – 2017.105 By adopting joint doctrine and 
emphasizing space as a warfare domain, India will more effectively counter Chinese 
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expansion in the IOR by reducing bureaucratic friction, developing and fielding new 
military technologies, and matching Chinese power projection with meaningful resistance.  
Furthermore, while India’s BMD program aims to counter the growing missile 
threat from China, it has also facilitated the development of India’s ASAT weapon in 
response to China’s advancements in the military-space domain. While India’s efforts to 
improve its warhead delivery capabilities date back to the 1980s, its embrace of a BMD 
system is a more recent example of the growing overlap between India’s civilian and non-
nuclear military space capabilities. India’s BMD program is currently comprised of the 
endo-atmospheric Advanced Air Defense and exo-atmospheric Prithvi Defense Vehicle 
systems, providing India with the ability to target incoming missiles at a projected altitude 
of 40 km and 150 km, respectively.106  
Advancements in India’s BMD program have played a critical role in the context 
of India’s space power strategy, as they provided New Delhi with the ability to produce a 
kinetic ASAT weapon of its own. In the years following China’s ASAT launch, the Indian 
government proclaimed that it would develop its own ASAT weapon, an unprecedented 
idea in the history of the formerly civilian-oriented space program.107 By 2013, the chief 
of the Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO), Avinash Chander, declared 
that India could develop an ASAT weapon on short notice given India’s advancements in 
BMD, requiring only accurate targeting technology and a kinetic kill vehicle.108 However, 
Chander also admitted that an ASAT demonstration was unlikely given the risks posed by 
the resulting orbital debris and the de facto demonstration of ASAT capabilities through 
BMD exercises.109  
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India departed from this policy in March of 2019, conducting its first successful 
ASAT test after one unsuccessful trial in February.110 During the test, India shot down its 
own satellite, the DRDO-owned Microsat-R launched in January 2019.111 In the wake of 
the test, Prime Minister Narendra Modi proclaimed that “India stands tall as a space 
power,” being one of four nations to successfully “acquire such a specialized & modern 
capability.”112 While the test has been perceived by some as a pre-election tactic by the 
Prime Minister, it has also been seen as a response to China’s increasingly threatening 
space power strategy and the constructive partnership between China and Pakistan in 
space.113 Despite the perceived electoral incentive, given India’s longstanding interest in 
pursuing an ASAT weapon, India’s weaponization of space is best understood as a form of 
internal balancing in response to the security threat from China. India has also made strides 
in its development of terrestrial directed energy weapons,114 representing a potential 
avenue towards laser-based ASAT capability in the future should it choose to pursue such 
an option. However, according to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, India does not 
yet possess satellite jamming capabilities and chose to test a kinetic kill vehicle for its first 
ASAT exercise because it “is a technology where we have developed capability…  we have 
used the technology that is appropriate to achieve the objectives set out in this mission.”115  
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India’s nuclear missiles also benefit from advancements in the civil space field and 
pose an unprecedented strategic threat to China. Although India’s nuclear strategy and 
space strategy differ significantly, the technological overlap in India’s new missiles and 
civilian launchers is worth noting given India’s history of repurposing civilian launch 
vehicle technology. India’s first ICBM, the solid-fueled Agni V, is reportedly an enhanced 
version of the Agni III which can operate on an extended range by using the solid-fuel 
motors from the PSVL or GSLV.116 Following a 2018 test of the Agni V, Nitin A. 
Gokhale, an Indian security analyst, declared that the Agni V is the first Indian missile 
capable of reaching “high value targets” on the Chinese coast like Shanghai given its 
increased range and status as an ICBM.117 Zhang Zhaozhang, a professor at the People’s 
Liberation Army National Defense University, recognized this improvement and declared 
that China must improve its BMD program in light of the successful test.118  
2. Commercial 
The commercial element of India’s revamped space strategy pits Antrix against 
China’s Great Wall Industry Corporation (GWIC) in a battle for market share in the global 
space economy and outreach among developing nations. On a larger scale, the rise of 
India’s commercial space industry reinforces national initiatives like Digital India, India’s 
response to Made in China 2025, by promoting innovation at the highest levels of the value 
chain to compete with China’s similar programs.119 Antrix has staked out a comparative 
advantage over its rival in the lightweight launch services industry, but GWIC remains 
ahead in the heavier segment. India and China are also competing to foster space start-ups 
as they become increasingly important to national space power. In this respect, India’s 
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commercial space industry is well positioned to compete with China’s given ISRO’s 
attention to increased privatization and public-private partnerships. 
India traditionally competed against China in the launch services industry by 
relying on the PSLV. By marketing a low-cost launcher to developing, budget-constrained 
space powers, India can effectively compete with GWIC to accumulate diplomatic capital. 
Given the PSLV’s relatively low launch price, averaging around $21 million per launch,120 
and ability to place multiple satellites in different orbits,121 India has staked out a unique 
advantage over China in the lightweight launch services industry. The PSLV set a world 
record for carrying the most satellites into space on a single launcher, having put 104 
satellites into orbit in a single 2017 mission.122 India leverages this cost-cutting ability to 
promote outreach among developing space powers in a way GWIC cannot. This is evident 
in the PSLV launch in June of 2017, in which 20 satellites from both established Western 
space powers and emerging spacefaring nations like Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Chile, and 
the Czech Republic were put into orbit through Antrix.123 
Given the more favorable price per kilogram ratio for low-earth orbit (LEO) 
launches the PSLV holds over China’s comparable Long March 4B booster (see Table 1), 
as well as its previously mentioned capabilities, Antrix has successfully outperformed 
GWIC in the lightweight launch services sector. Although the Long March 3B/E is more 
efficient in delivering satellites to LEO, the launcher is primarily utilized for heavy 
geosynchronous orbit (GEO) launches,124 leaving other launchers to compete with the 
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PSLV. Despite this efficiency and the program’s success over GWIC, the PSLV is designed 
to launch small satellites, a much less profitable endeavor than heavier alternatives.125 
However, the low cost per launch has greater potential for international outreach among 
developing space powers, as the PSLV offers a low-cost method for financially constrained 
states compared to costlier, heavier alternatives. Until Antrix can field a more competitive 
heavy launcher, India’s commercial space launch industry will remain limited to catering 
to a less profitable segment of the market.126 However, India will be buoyed by the 
diplomatic capital its lightweight launches provide. 















PSLV $21 million 3,250 kg 1,425 kg $6,500 $14,700 
GSLV $47 million 5,000 kg 2,500 kg $9,400 $18,800 
GSLV MkIII $60 million 8,000 kg 4,000 kg $7,500 $15,000 
Long March 
4B 
$30 million 4,200 kg 1,500 kg $7,100 $20,000 
Long March 
3B/E 
$70 million 12,000 kg 5,500 kg $5,800 $12,700 
 
The prospects for Antrix outcompeting GWIC in the heavy launch sector are 
presently poor. It was not until recently that India produced its own cryogenic engine for 
the GSLV, integrating it into Antrix’s portfolio of available hardware. The GSLV attained 
fully indigenous capacity in 2014 after over a decade of development, when the rocket 
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successfully employed the Indian built cryogenic booster.128 China, on the other hand, has 
utilized the Long March 3B/E, its heavy GEO launch vehicle, since the mid-1990s, offering 
a more efficient price per kilogram ratio than the GSLV.129  Antrix hopes that the in-
development GSLV Mk III, also called the LVM3,130 will be a more viable competitor to 
China’s heavy launchers. The GSLV MkIII promises to deliver payloads 3,000 kg heavier 
into LEO and 1500kg more into GEO than the standard GSLV.131 Nonetheless, although 
the GSLV MkIII is more efficient than China’s light GEO launcher, the Long March 3A, 
it still can’t outcompete the Long March 3B/E.132 Furthermore, the upcoming Long March 
V could very well be cheaper than the GSLV MkIII once it becomes operational, posing a 
longer term threat to India’s heavy launch prospects.133 
While Antrix remains the primary element of India’s commercial space strategy, a 
coordinated effort by India’s government aims to foster the development of the private 
sector to compete against similar initiatives in China. As previously mentioned, Antrix was 
founded with the intention of facilitating private space industries. However, it was not until 
recently that the Indian government offered meaningful support to private actors in 
commercial space. The passage of the Space Activities Bill of 2017, which provides 
oversight on matters of licensing, supervision, and liability, aims to support the private 
productization of the PSLV and other initiatives conducive to promoting an efficient supply 
chain and economy of scale.134 By authorizing wider production of the PSLV, ISRO can 
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devote its scarce resources to other projects such as the manned space flight program and 
the GSLV Mk III.135 Furthermore, ISRO is interested in collaborating directly with the 
private sector in satellite development, having facilitated the development of 30–35 
satellites through a public-private partnership.136  
To a lesser extent, India and China are competing to produce high-caliber space 
start-ups to spur innovation and efficiency. Drawing inspiration from models in the West, 
ISRO is looking to “incubate” start-ups by cultivating their competitiveness domestically 
before they enter the global market.137 According to the chief of ISRO, K. Sivan, “ISRO 
will provide the seed money to these start-ups. It will also bear the cost of infrastructure 
and provide initial funds to start-ups for space equipment” through these incubators.138 
ISRO plans to build six incubation centers and six corresponding research hubs by late 
2019.139 These efforts by ISRO to foster private sector development and public-private 
collaboration represent the increased attention to efficiency within India’s space economy. 
However, despite its achievements, India’s commercial space sector is still in its early 
stages, and it will take time for its incubators and other growth favoring policies to take 
full effect. Nonetheless, the long-term outlook for India’s commercial space industry 
benefits from government support, the PSLV’s efficiency, and ISRO’s pragmatic interest 
to privatize existing services so as to focus on larger, high-visibility civil missions. 
3. Civil 
India recognizes China’s outreach across Asia and the IOR and is taking steps to 
compete with its growing regional influence through the use of space diplomacy. 
Surrounded by the String of Pearls, India continues to rely on its bilateral relations and 
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involvement in multilateral forums to promote strong relationships, further its space-
related interests, and counter China’s soft power strategy. As for national prestige, India’s 
space exploration missions aim to close the gap with China’s technological and 
astronomical achievements. While China still leads India in this respect, ISRO’s pipeline 
of astronomical exploration projects aims to close this gap and bolster India’s status across 
both Asia and the international community.  
Given the role of non-aligned international cooperation throughout ISRO’s history, 
it is unsurprising that ISRO has continued to collaborate with its foreign partners of 
conflicting strategic ambitions. By continuing to collaborate with both sides of the 
geopolitical spectrum, India benefits from increased opportunities for partnership and 
mutual benefit as it aims to compete with China on earth and in space. ISRO continues to 
cooperate with NASA, as the two space agencies are conducting a joint mission using a 
highly advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR): Nisar.140 The Nisar satellite is intended 
to “observe and take measurements of some of the planet’s most complex processes, 
including ecosystem disturbances, ice-sheet collapse, and natural hazards such as 
earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes and landslides.”141 India is also hosting a ground station 
for the Russian satellite navigation system GLONASS in exchange for the reciprocal 
expansion of the IRNSS, fulfilling the promise of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
between ISRO and Roscosmos.142 The security-related implications of both of these 
projects are significant, as India’s ability to cooperate with established military powers in 
the development of sensitive space technologies provides a strong foundation for security-
related cooperation amidst China’s rise. 
While ISRO still collaborates with its closest historical partners, the organization’s 
growth is beginning to come full circle, as it is expanding its assistance to rising space 
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powers around the world in response to China’s increasing diplomatic clout. ISRO has 
signed MoUs and Framework Agreements with states such as Armenia, Bulgaria, 
Indonesia, Mauritius, Mexico, South Africa, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Vietnam.143 These 
arrangements often facilitate cooperation in joint research projects for space science and 
space applications.144  India has even brokered an MoU for the peaceful use of outer space 
with China. This rare example of bilateral space-related cooperation between the two rival 
civilizations listed a number of specific projects for ISRO and CNSA to work on, including 
remote sensing data sharing and exchange and the cross-calibration of each country’s 
respective remote sensing and astronomical observation satellites.145 Although the 
brokerage of this MoU is noteworthy given the Sino-Indian rivalry, the MoU excludes 
security applications and its concrete proposals are limited, with few exceptions, primarily 
to space science missions. Areas such as deep space exploration, space components, and 
satellite navigation warrant mere discussion under the MoU’s guidelines and could 
potentially yield no results by the agreement’s expiration in 2020. 
India’s efforts to promote its image as a top-tier space power and compete with 
China for influence are evident in its activity in the Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency 
Forum (APRSAF). India does not participate in the China-led APSCO but instead has sent 
delegations to Japan’s annual regional space forum APRSAF consistently since 2005 to 
promote its image as a responsible space power. It has co-hosted the forum twice, in 2007 
and 2017, promoting the themes of “Space for Human Empowerment” and “Space 
Technology for Enhanced Governance and Development,” respectively.146 These subjects 
cater to emerging space powers at the forum and supplement India’s bilateral approach to 
                                                 
143 “International Cooperation,” ISRO, accessed February 7, 2019, 
https://www.isro.gov.in/international-cooperation. 
144 “SANSA and ISRO Sign MoU during BRICS Summit,” SANSA, accessed February 7, 2019, 
https://www.sansa.org.za/2018/08/02/sansa-and-isro-sign-mou-during-brics-summit/; “India and Mexico 
Cooperate on Remote Sensing,” UN SPIDER, October 23, 2014, http://www.un-spider.org/news-and-
events/news/india-and-mexico-cooperate-remote-sensing. 
145 “2015-2020 Space Cooperation Outline between ISRO and CNSA,” ISRO and CNSA, May 15, 
2015, http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/CH15B2096.pdf. 
146 “Annual Meetings | APRSAF-14,” APRSAF, accessed February 7, 2019, https://www.aprsaf.org/
annual_meetings/aprsaf14/meeting_details.php; “Annual Meetings | APRSAF-24,” APRSAF, accessed 
February 7, 2019, https://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf24/meeting_details.php.  
37 
diplomacy with developing space powers. Despite its absence at the annual conference in 
its early years, India has become one of APRSAF’s most active contributors, represented 
by a diversified body of dignitaries from across the vast Indian bureaucracy.147 India even 
holds one of four seats at the APRSAF Executive Committee as a result of its previous co-
hosting, providing agenda setting power up to the 2021 Forum.148 India’s recently earned 
status on the APRSAF executive committee is an especially notable achievement. Despite 
the rotating basis of the position, for the time being, India wields valuable agenda setting 
power at a time when APRSAF is seeing some of its highest levels of participation.  
India’s leadership in regional space cooperation is especially significant in the 
context of China’s SIC and BRI. Despite its contributions to BRI, and by extension, its 
access to services offered in SIC,149 India is unlikely to utilize Chinese space-based 
resources as it already possesses its own assets which offer similar services. Given the 
massive scale and scope of this Chinese project, India’s ability to counteract China’s soft 
power space influence is critical to maintaining its prestige and diplomatic leverage in the 
region. While India cannot compete with the scale of investment comprising BRI at large, 
India can counteract China’s soft power influence in the space domain through its 
leadership in APRSAF and bilateral partnerships. 
While India has historically been a leader at the U.N. and other international 
forums, the changing geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific presents an opportunity 
to leverage India’s activity in international organizations for increased diplomatic outreach 
over China. India is very active in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(UN-COPUOS) and its subcommittees, advocating for responsible state behavior in 
space.150 India is also currently a leading contributor to the UN Space Based Information 
for Disaster Management and Emergency Response, wielding its expertise in remote 
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sensing technology to benefit disaster-plagued nations. India leverages its participation in 
multilateral associations outside the UN to advance its space-related interests on the world 
stage as well. India is active in both the International Institute of Space Law and Inter-
Agency Debris Coordination Committee, offering more opportunities to influence 
international norms of state behavior.151 India’s active engagement with multilateral 
agencies like those previously described serve to advance India’s vision of a rules-based 
space order and offer a proactive effort to dissuade China’s provocative activity in space.  
A relatively new development in India’s civil space program is its space science 
initiatives geared towards students. By investing in human capital, India has promoted its 
prospects for innovation in the long term which could be key in its struggle to surpass 
China in space. One program has sent student-built satellites into orbit, having launched 
Kalamsat, built on a 3D printer, in January 2019.152 Kalamsat was built by students from 
the organization Space Kidz India, a group that provides mentorship to students interested 
in science and technology, representing the role civil society is playing in India’s civil 
space strategy.153  ISRO also plans to develop a set of space-focused research hubs near 
academic institutions in support of its commercial incubator program, representing yet 
another element of India’s investments in space-related education.154  
India’s academic efforts also reinforce its diplomatic approach to space power 
through exchanges. India serves as the host for the Centre for Space Science and 
Technology Education for Asia and the Pacific which offers degrees to students from 
across the region.155 Additionally, ISRO has sponsored another program with support from 
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the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) for international students, 
bringing young scholars from 45 developing countries together to collaborate on small 
satellite development.156 These efforts collectively signify ISRO’s investment in India’s 
long term approach to soft space power. By investing in the human capital of its own 
citizens and its image as a leader in space science among the international community, 
India is expanding the scale and scope of its outreach beyond its traditional policies which 
relied primarily on space applications for development.  
ISRO has continued to invest in its civil space capabilities, emphasizing its 
traditional strengths while also expanding the scope of its space-related capacity. Both the 
INSAT and GSAT constellations have grown to incorporate military applications in to their 
longstanding commercial purposes, representing the multipurpose capacity of India’s 
civilly administrated constellations. One communications satellite, GSAT-9, was 
proclaimed as a “gift” from India to fellow South Asian nations to promote regional unity, 
representing the civil constellation’s new role in regional diplomacy.157 Given China’s 
targeting of small South Asian nations with “debt trap” diplomacy, India’s generous offer 
counters China’s expanding regional influence and places it in stark contrast to a 
transactional, aggressive China.158 While the expansion of civil satellite constellations like 
the GSAT series exemplifies India’s commitment to leadership in the earth observation and 
satellite communications domains, ISRO has also ventured into new territory, namely the 
fields of astronomical observation and space exploration. 
India’s civil space program has surprised many international observers with the 
scale and scope of its space exploration missions. Much of India’s newfound attention to 
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space science and exploration has been driven by China’s high-profile Shenzhou taikonaut 
missions, Chang’e lunar exploration missions, and other similar projects. In 2008, a PSLV 
launched the Chandrayaan-1 lunar probe carrying scientific payloads from European and 
American organizations.159 Although the mission reached the moon successfully and 
conducted over 3,400 lunar orbits,160 communication with the satellite was lost in August 
2009 when it crashed into the moon, frustrating the project’s foreign collaborators since 
ISRO did not previously disclose the probe’s technical weaknesses.161 Although China 
beat India to the moon, India managed to beat China to Mars by launching the Mangalyaan 
spacecraft in 2013 without international assistance. As the first Asian nation to reach Mars 
orbit, India relished in its victory over more established regional space powers to achieve 
this milestone. An official from the Indian Institute of Science proclaimed that “people will 
see India as a destination for high-end projects” following ISRO’s successful journey to 
the Red Planet, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi boasted that the mission “[cost] less 
than it takes to make a Hollywood movie.”162 Modi was not exaggerating, as the mission 
cost only $74 million,163 signaling that India could very well outpace China’s space 
exploration missions in the future without taking drastic financial measures. 
India has capitalized on the strong techno-nationalist sentiment following 
Mangalyaan to achieve more objectives in space ahead of China. The Chandrayaan-2 lunar 
mission is currently planned for July of 2019.164 ISRO describes the mission as “totally 
indigenous” and plans to land a semi-autonomous rover to analyze soil from the lunar 
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surface.165 Though the program aims to deliver India a “first” in space, as the rover is 
intended to explore the previously untouched South Pole, the mission has been delayed 
multiple times and may not launch as intended.166 In addition to a return to the moon, 
ISRO is planning a follow-on mission to Mars and its first spacecraft mission to Venus in 
the early 2020s.167 China has yet to explore Venus, offering India another feasible victory 
in the regional space race. 
Among the most noteworthy of India’s civil space developments is its official 
dedication to a manned-space flight mission. A successful manned spaceflight mission 
would not only mark an especially significant step toward catching up with China’s 
manned Shenzhou spaceflight program, but also place India in one of the most select clubs 
among spacefaring nations. Although many nations have sent astronauts into space aboard 
foreign launchers, only the United States, Russia and China have independently launched 
astronauts into space.168 In December of 2018, the Indian government set aside $1.43 
billion for an astronaut mission, the first manned spaceflight mission conducted totally by 
ISRO.169 The Ganganyaan project promises to send three astronauts into space and will 
receive collaborative assistance from CNES and Roscomos.170 While France and Russia 
will not assist India in directly placing the astronauts in space, they will assist India in 
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aspects related to space medicine and astronaut training, respectively, prior to the 
launch.171 The Ganganyaan mission is projected for 2021.172  
C. CONCLUSION 
The long-standing rivalry between China and India shows little signs of warming, 
especially in the context of space power competition. Advancements in India’s space-
strategic calculations are part of a larger national effort to preserve India’s status as a 
regional power and close the power disparity with China. To India, China’s rise is a zero-
sum game with dire consequences should it fail to meaningfully compete with its northern 
adversary. In response to Chinese military modernization, the Indian space program has 
expanded its focus from civilian applications to incorporate military support roles. India’s 
nuclear arsenal and BMD programs have also benefitted from repurposed technology and 
expertise, signaling New Delhi’s commitment to countering China’s regional aggression. 
Additionally, India’s commercial space sector is receiving unprecedented support from the 
national government that aims to counter China’s early steps toward developing a 
commercial space industry. Though not without its weaknesses, India’s budding space 
economy is on an upward trajectory with a high upside potential. Diplomatically, India has 
promoted its status as a major space power and regional leader through its diplomatic 
initiatives at regional forums and the UN. 
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Japan has witnessed China’s rise as a great power with suspicion and concern. 
Japan’s regional prominence has gone largely unchallenged from the end of World War II 
until the early 2000s, but China’s rapid development now threatens to undermine Japan’s 
status as a regional power. China has successfully overtaken Japan as the world’s second 
largest economy by GDP, increased its power projection capabilities, and grown more 
assertive in its foreign policy, much to Tokyo’s dismay. These factors have driven strategic 
shifts within Japan to balance against China. Japan is also threatened by China’s rise as a 
space power, as China’s space power strategy threatens Japan’s national security and its 
ability to wield economic and diplomatic influence across Asia. Accordingly, Japan has 
reformed its space policy to incorporate militarized security applications, expand the scale 
and scope of its diplomatic outreach, and break into the global commercial space market. 
This chapter will analyze these reforms in Japan’s space strategy that have been driven by 
China’s rise as a major space power and discuss the relevant regional security implications. 
The analysis will begin by detailing the history of Japan’s space program. Next, Japan’s 
strategic reform will be examined across the civil, commercial, and military domains while 
assessing how they address the growing Chinese threat. The conclusion will summarize the 
chapter’s key findings. 
A. HISTORY OF JAPAN’S SPACE PROGRAM 
The history of Japan’s space program is characterized by successive strings of 
failures and resounding successes, tracing its origins back to World War II. During the 
Second World War, Imperial Japan experimented with three rocket-based platforms 
dedicated to military use: a rocket-propelled kamikaze airplane, and two experimental jet 
fighters with rocket-assisted capabilities. The first of Japan’s experiments with rocketry 
was based on the Messerschmitt Me 163 jet fighter.173 Nazi Germany transferred the 
blueprints for the rocket powered Messerschmitt Me 163 interceptor during a covert 
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submarine mission toward the end of the war.174 This transfer spurred development of the 
J8M Shushui and Ki-200 aircraft for the Imperial Navy and Army Air Force, respectively, 
but a problematic rocket motor precluded the planes’ operationalization.175 The Nakajima 
Kikka was another product of technology sharing between the Axis powers, inspired by 
the Messerschmitt Me 262 fighter. The Kikka boasted rocket-assisted takeoff, but was also 
plagued by experimental failures and never saw combat service.176 The kamikaze plane 
Ohka was the only rocket-assisted platform Japan successfully fielded during the war, 
employing it against American forces in the Battle of Okinawa in the spring of 1945.177  
Following Japan’s surrender and the ensuing Allied occupation, Japan was 
prevented from developing aerospace technology, but civilian experimentation with 
rocketry was permitted following the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.178 The 
University of Tokyo began experimenting with sounding rockets soon after in 1955 and 
became the host of the newly founded Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science (ISAS) 
in 1964.179 ISAS faced early headwinds, as the organization could not place Japan’s first 
satellite into orbit even after four successive trials between 1966 and 1969.180 The National 
Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) was then founded in 1969 and was tasked 
with improving Japan’s technical space capacity while ISAS emphasized progress in space 
science.181 Then, in 1969, to overcome the difficulties plaguing domestic rocketry, Japan 
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brokered an agreement with its American ally to secure proven launch vehicle 
technology.182 However, according to RAND analyst Steven Berger, “the terms of the 
agreement prohibited re-exporting of the technology by Japan, which effectively precluded 
Japan from marketing any of the resulting launchers in the international market for launch 
services.”183 
Japan’s space program was further constrained in 1969 following the signing of the 
Peaceful Purposes Resolution (PPR) and by strict interpretations of the post-war 
constitution. The PPR supplemented the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, which outlined 
the non-aggressive use of space by world powers, collectively forming a remarkably 
peaceful space policy relative to other space powers.184 Strict interpretations of Article 9 
of Japan’s post-war constitution also constrained some space-related developments. 
According to British security analyst and professor Columba Peoples, under the PPR, 
Japan’s space bureaucracy felt that military-space developments were unconstitutional, as 
Article 9 precluded the maintenance of “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
potential.”185 While the international norm established by the Cold War superpowers 
interprets the OST as allowing for passive militarization, to include missions such as 
information gathering, the previously mentioned legal constraints guided Japan’s space 
program throughout the remainder of the Cold War.  
While China was preoccupied with internal instability following the Cultural 
Revolution, throwing nearly all but its launch vehicle program into disarray,186 Japan’s 
space program continued to utilize American technology, overcoming early obstacles and 
cementing its regional supremacy in space. In 1970, Japan not only launched its first 
satellite, Ohsumi, after years of mistrials, but also became the first regional state to orbit a 
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spacecraft.187 NASDA also began developing the N-1 launcher, based on the U.S. Delta 
launch vehicle, relying heavily on both American technical expertise and components.188 
The N-1 was later used to launch the test satellite Kiku in 1975.189 The N-2 project 
commenced in 1976, but the program was also heavily dependent on assistance from the 
United States.190 These cooperative projects provided Japan’s space agencies with 
experience and the technical capacity necessary to begin developing fully indigenous 
capabilities. By the end of their service in 1987, N-series launchers had launched 15 
satellites.191 However, Japan could not market the N-series given the high degree of 
American input, leading to the development of indigenous launch vehicles in the 1980s.192  
The 1980s marked the beginning of this shift to full indigenous development. In 
1981, ISAS was renamed the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, administered 
by the Ministry of Education, as part of a larger bureaucratic reorientation.193 The newly 
reorganized ISAS engaged in a variety of scientific and space exploration missions during 
the 1980s. Suisei and Sakigake, two observational probes, successfully passed Halley’s 
Comet in 1985 alongside probes from both sides of the Iron Curtain.194 Equally important 
to the missions’ success was the formation of the Inter-Agency Consultative Group, an 
intermediary between Japan’s space agencies and their international partners.195 In 1986 
NASDA conducted the H-I’s inaugural launch, which utilized Japanese technology in most 
of the second stage and all of the third stage.196 While the H-I symbolized a significant 
step toward Japan’s objectives in the heavy launch sector, the first stage utilized American 
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components, precluding commercial operations with the launcher.197 However, Japanese 
corporations eyed prospects in commercial satellite technology at this time while the 
government participated in some studies with the United States during the SDI period, 
despite the constraints posed by Japan’s PPR.198 
Despite progress made during the Cold War, Japan’s space program faced 
headwinds in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1992, China, Pakistan, and Thailand 
formed the Asia Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications 
organization (AP-MCSTA).199 The AP-MCSTA organized a series of conferences to 
promote mutual cooperation in space related developments across Asia and represented 
China’s initial venture into space diplomacy.200 The AP-MCSTA threatened Japan’s 
outreach efforts and constituted a direct effort at competition between the rival states. In 
1993, Japan established APRSAF in response.201 Japan has utilized APRSAF to compete 
with its Chinese-led counterpart by establishing working ties with major and developing 
space powers alike such as India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Mongolia, South Korea, 
and Australia through its own annual forum.  
Japan’s commercial ventures in space also faced headwinds during this time. The 
H-2 launcher, the first totally indigenous Japanese rocket, suffered a string of consecutive 
failures in the late 1990s and never carried a commercial payload by the end of its 
lifespan.202 Ambitious plans for commercial satellite producers were also constrained by 
high development costs and superior international competition.203 Although Japan had 
clearly achieved more in space than China by this time, China’s ability to launch satellites 
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cheaply represented another challenge to Japan’s space outreach and desired 
competitiveness in the launch services segment. Coupled with the economic downturn in 
Japan throughout the 1990s, commercial space industries were forced to consolidate and 
received meager government support compared to that a decade prior.204  
Furthermore, North Korea launched its Taepodong-1 missile over Japan’s airspace 
and territory in 1998, renewing security concerns and debates surrounding Japan’s strict 
interpretation of the peaceful use of space. In response, Japan launched a series of 
Information Gathering Satellites (IGS), optical observation satellites meant to provide 
intelligence and reduce Japan’s reliance on American intelligence assets.205 Despite this 
intent, and the program’s contracting to Mitsubishi, the initial satellites relied on 
technology from the United States.206 The initial IGS constellation was placed under the 
oversight of the Cabinet Intelligence Office instead of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) 
as the PPR still constrained the military’s role in space security policy at the time.207 Japan 
also signed a three-year MoU with the United States to begin expanded cooperation in 
BMD.208 The primary focus of the MoU was to research and develop an enhanced version 
of the sea-based American SM-3 interceptor missile and expand the scope of the U.S. 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) initiative.209 This favorable collaborative basis is rooted 
in the shared use of the Aegis combat system, a target-tracking radar system that serves as 
a pillar of the U.S. naval BMD system, between the JMSDF and U.S. Navy.210  
Despite these challenges, post-Cold-War Japan did not go without its successes. 
Japan successfully launched a lunar probe in 1990 and was a founding member of the 
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International Space Station (ISS).211 Japan also streamlined its space bureaucracy in 2003 
by bringing its existing space agencies—NASDA, ISAS, and the National Aerospace 
Lab—under the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in 2003.212 This reform 
aimed to reduce bureaucratic friction caused by pooling space-related resources into one 
overarching administration.213 By this time, Japan had also sent four astronauts into space 
to help assemble the ISS.214 However, China completed its first successful manned 
spaceflight mission, Shenzhou V, this same year. Shenzhou V constituted an unexpected 
challenge to Japan’s preeminence as the regional leader in science and technology, raising 
questions surrounding Japan’s competitiveness in space.215 
Having beaten Japan to an independent manned spaceflight mission, China’s 
techno-nationalist ambitions posed an increasing challenge to Japan’s regional leadership. 
Liberal Democratic Party official Tameo Kawamura felt that Japan needed to reshape its 
approach to space policy to avoid falling behind China. Accordingly, Kawamura launched 
a comprehensive internal initiative with support from fellow Diet members and industry 
leaders.216 According to American space analyst James Clay Moltz, the Kawamura 
initiative “called for a shift from science to applications, a more streamlined administration, 
and the freedom to pursue military uses of space.”217 In the aftermath of China’s 2007 
ASAT launch, China’s first major military-space demonstration, the Diet urgently fulfilled 
Kawamura’s ambitions, producing the first major shift in Japan’s space strategy since the 
adoption of the PPR almost 40 years prior: the Basic Space Law (BSL).  
The BSL, alongside other post-Cold War reforms, collectively aimed to address the 
challenges presented by China’s emergence as a major space power and aspiring regional 
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hegemon. While the BSL outlined civilian guidelines for space diplomacy and commercial 
activity, it is most significant for allowing the military use of space.218 To compete with 
China’s growing regional presence, militarized space assets allow Japan’s military to 
embrace enhanced C4ISR capabilities amidst its ongoing process of military 
normalization. Although the BSL reiterated the desire for the peaceful use of space and 
upheld the role of space in societal development in accordance with previous doctrine,219 
the Diet’s official embrace of the militarization of space is a clear response to increased 
saber rattling from its most powerful adversary: China.  
B. CONTEMPORARY SHIFTS IN SPACE STRATEGY 
1. Military 
From a security standpoint, the implications of the BSL are clear in the context of 
China’s shift towards a regional power projection strategy from one of external defense. 
The BSL provides the SDF with a potential for space-enhanced combat effectiveness by 
allowing for military-space capabilities in a break from Japan’s historical norm. Most 
notably, the BSL allowed for the militarization of space, departing from the constitutional 
and PPR-derived policy which precluded Japan from developing military-space 
capabilities.220 Pekannen and Kallender-Umezu argue that the passing of BSL indicated 
Japan’s intent to incorporate security into its space strategy after having developed an 
initial degree of capacity prior to 2008.221 They explain how Japanese corporations found 
safe haven from the myriad of challenges that hindered their ability to compete by securing 
contracts from the American and Japanese security-bureaucracies. Furthermore, they claim 
Japan has taken advantage of manufacturers’ willingness to produce military technology, 
coupled with the shifts detailed in BSL, to militarize space in response to Chinese military 
development. Projects they find evident of this trend include the previously mentioned 
work on SDI, IGS, and terrestrially-based BMD collaboration.  
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While these projects commenced prior to the passing of the BSL, the legislation 
allowed the JSDF to play a larger role in space security. Before 2008, as previously 
explained in reference to the IGS constellation, the JSDF did not operate security-related 
hardware in space. However, Article 14 of the BSL allowed the state to utilize space in a 
manner that would “contribute to the national security of Japan.”222 After the BSL went 
into effect, the JSDF could not only operate existing assets, such as the IGS program 
formerly under civilian oversight, but also manufacture satellites going forward.223  While 
the IGS project has continued to the present under the JSDF, the MoD and JSDF also 
launched two military dedicated communications satellites, Kirameki-2 and Kirameki-1, to 
improve command and control capabilities in 2017 and 2018, respectfully.224 The force-
multiplying capabilities provided by these militarized space assets will benefit Japan’s 
efforts to counter the growing Chinese military presence across the Pacific, especially in 
strategic hotspots like the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and South China Sea. As 
Japan maintains its strategic interests at these locations, effective maritime patrols will 
become increasingly necessary amidst China’s assertive foreign policy. Such patrols stand 
to benefit from space-derived information and C4ISR capabilities provided by Japan’s 
network of military satellites. 
The Quasi-Zenith satellite navigation constellation offers similar military utility. 
Japan’s Quasi-Zenith constellation can serve as both an augment to the U.S. operated GPS 
and an independent regionally focused system.225 China recognizes the American 
military’s dependence on GPS, making it a likely target should hostilities breakout between 
the two powers. Using Quasi-Zenith, Japan can operate its own space-based navigational 
platform for military and civilian should GPS be disabled. Although Quasi-Zenith provides 
enhanced navigational coverage across territorial Japan, the network’s unique figure-eight 
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orbital pattern also provides coverage across the entirety of the East Asia-Oceania 
region.226 As the JSDF becomes more active outside mainland Japan, especially in 
geopolitical hotspots like the South China Sea, this enhanced independent navigational 
capacity will be of increasing benefit to the JSDF as it counters China’s regional presence. 
Although not of the same global scale China’s Beidou aims to reach, Quasi-Zenith offers 
Japan an important regionally focused capability and address potential vulnerabilities. 
The nuclear threat posed by China and North Korea has yielded to an elevated role 
for BMD in Japan’s space strategy. Though not considered weaponized space assets as 
they are currently employed, Japan’s Aegis-equipped platforms and SM-3 missile 
interceptors constitute a potential ASAT weapon. The United States and Japan jointly 
developed the SM-3 series of missile interceptors following the North Korean Taepodong 
launch in 1998.227 The United States intercepted one of its own unresponsive intelligence 
satellites with this interceptor in February of 2008 following China’s ASAT launch the 
previous year.228 Given the interceptor’s demonstrated success against satellites, and that 
the United States and Japan have made a decade’s worth of improvements to the SM-3 
series since this exercise, Japan clearly has a potential interceptor for an ASAT weapon. 
Japan also employs the Aegis combat system, a targeting platform for missile defense, and 
has announced plans to acquire even more Aegis platforms to address rising threats. 
According to Japan’s 2017 and 2018 Defense White Papers, Japan will stage two new 
Aegis Ashore systems under the Ground Self-Defense Force,229 and procure two new 
Aegis-equipped destroyers to field a total of eight sea-based defense systems.230 Coupled 
together, the SM-3 and Aegis combat system, at sea and ashore, represent Japan’s road to 
ASAT capability on land and sea should it choose to repurpose these technologies.  
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Japan’s strategic leadership has also indicated its desire to incorporate space 
security as a larger piece of the defense apparatus to compete with China’s military 
modernization. Not only is the Japanese government facilitating cooperation between 
JAXA and the JSDF,231 but the JSDF is also dedicated to improving its space monitoring 
and debris-tracking capabilities amidst China’s increased activity in space. In 2015, the 
United States and Japan established a Space Cooperative Working Group (SCWG) and 
updated the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, a set of principles last 
modified in 1997.232  The SCWG has identified areas of cooperation for the U.S. and Japan 
in order to promote collective space security and assist the JSDF in its transition to 
becoming a space-integrated force. In 2016, the MoD allocated approximately $2 million 
toward designing a debris-tracking network meant to not only improve space situational 
awareness (SSA) but also to reduce reliance on JAXA and the United States.233 The MoD 
will use these blueprints to establish an SSA-dedicated facility as well as a military center 
for earth observation by FY 2022.234 Additionally, Japan’s National Defense Program 
Guidelines for FY2019 prescribed the following policies as part of a comprehensive space 
security agenda: the creation of an air force unit dedicated to space operations, an emphasis 
on disrupting adversaries’ information warfare capabilities, the use of space assets if 
attacked, an increase in space-based cooperation with the United States, and leadership in 
fostering cooperative norms of international space behavior.235 
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2. Commercial 
Japan’s commercial space industry has shown remarkable progress from the 
troubled 1990s, now competing with China for market share in the global space economy. 
As previously mentioned, Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu argue that Japan’s space 
corporations found a lifeline by securing lucrative contracts from the government to 
produce military-space technology following the passing of the BSL. Japan’s 
conglomerates also began capitalizing on a resurgence of research and collaboration on 
military projects with the United States amidst the industry’s weakness.236 This is not to 
say that Japan’s commercial space industry became a military-industrial complex. Instead, 
Japan’s commercial space industry, though still facing fierce international competition and 
internal challenges, has embraced shifts initiated by the BSL to survive by producing 
military satellites and related hardware for the first time.  
The BSL also called for increased public-private cooperation in addition to what 
had proceeded by the time of its implementation. Article 4 of the BSL states that Japan 
shall “strengthen the technical capabilities and international competitiveness of the space 
industry and other industries of Japan,” while Article 16 details how the Japanese 
government can promote the domestic space industry by providing top-down assistance in 
the form of tax incentives and use of their services.237 These measures can be directly 
inferred as state-led means to support commercial activity outside the ongoing security-
related projects that Pekannen and Kallender-Umezu identify as the saving grace for the 
troubled corporations.238 Given the rapid expansion of the international space economy, 
many Asian nations are competing to secure their foothold in this segment before they are 
crowded out. Japan is no different and has invested heavily in its launch services industry 
to compete with China in this increasingly important domain. 
Prior to the BSL, Japan’s commercial space industry was hindered by the absence 
of a reliable launcher and crowded out of the international market by more efficient 
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competitors like China. The BSL’s initiatives supplemented technical progress made by 
the commercial sector to produce an operating commercial launch program. In 2007, 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) was granted oversight of the H-IIA launch program, 
one year prior to the passing of the BSL.239 The first commercial launch for the H-IIA 
occurred in 2015 when MHI launched Telstar 12V for a Canadian corporation.240  Despite 
the breakout into the global market, the H-IIA’s success can be mainly attributed to its use 
by the Japanese government. Telestar 12V remains H-IIA’s only commercial launch; 
however, the H-IIB, a variant of the H-IIA, has reliably launched a series of foreign 
satellites to the ISS.241 While the H-IIB was authorized for commercial service under MHI 
in 2012,242 it has yet to conduct such a launch, leaving the H-IIA as Japan’s primary 
commercial launcher.  
The experience of the H-IIA and H-IIB following the BSL represents how the new 
legislation has benefitted Japan’s commercial launch industry, but Japan’s launch industry 
still suffers from stronger competition. The H-IIA suffers from an inefficient price per 
kilogram ratio, diminishing its appeal to international customers (see Table 2). Comparing 
Japanese and Chinese launchers with similar specifications, the H-IIA carries 2,000 kg less 
than the Long March 3B/E launchers and costs over $3,200 more per kilogram to launch 
than its Chinese counterpart into LEO.243 China holds an advantage in geosynchronous 
orbit (GEO) launches over the H-IIA as well, as the Long March 3B/E costs almost $10,000 
less per kilogram of cargo to launch.244 Japan’s promising H-III launcher, on the other 
hand, can carry the same payload as an H-IIA into LEO for $20 million less than a Chinese 
Long March 3B/E model, with savings of $800 less per kilogram. Furthermore, a H-III can 
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put cargo into GEO for $5,000 less per kilogram than the Long March 3B/E. Despite this 
advantage, China plans to retire this booster by 2020.245 Its successors, the Long March 5, 
6, and 7, could all offer superior efficiency and eliminate the H-III’s advantage once they 
come into full service, although estimated price specifications are currently unavailable for 
the Chinese rockets in development.246 
















H-IIA $90 million 10,000 kg 4,000 kg $9,000 $22,500 
H-III $50 million 10,000 kg 6,500 kg $5,000 $7,700 







$30 million 4,200 kg 1,500 kg $7,100 $20,000 
Long March 
3B/E 
$70 million 12,000 kg 5,500 kg $5,800 $12,700 
 
The Epsilon Launcher, an indigenous lightweight launch vehicle, could provide 
Japan’s commercial space industry a much-needed boon for the longer term. Jointly 
produced by JAXA and IHI Aerospace,248 the Epsilon possesses a plethora of advantages 
over the aging H-II that could allow Japan to earn market share in the crowded launch 
services industry. With a launch cost estimated at half of the H-IIA’s, and amidst the 
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continuing market demand for smaller satellites, the Epsilon could attract more customers 
than its predecessors, a prerequisite for sustainable price competitiveness.249 Such 
improvements include an onboard autonomous inspection feature and an improved mobile 
control infrastructure, allowing Epsilon launches to be conducted within seven days of one 
another compared to 42 for the retired M-V launcher.250 The increased efficiency and 
frequency promised by the Epsilon Launcher have the potential to capture a share of the 
launch services industry in a manner not before possible with other launchers in Japan. 
However, based on estimates by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Epsilon will 
suffer an incredibly high price per kilogram ratio.251 If Japan cannot deliver more 
competitive specifications as intended, the Epsilon may be crowded out by more efficient 
alternatives in China and elsewhere. While Japan’s progress in the launch services industry 
is promising, it is not clear whether it will be able to outcompete China in the long term.  
Despite the disadvantages posed by Japan’s fleeting hold on comparative advantage 
over China in the heavy launch services industry, as well as the disparity in commercial 
launches conducted by Japan and other major space powers,252 Japan aims to stimulate its 
commercial space industry through its support of start-ups. Chinese start-ups have attracted 
almost $500 million in investment funding since 2016,253 and Japan has responded by 
offering its own start-ups generous financial assistance. Japan’s start-ups stand to benefit 
from a $940 million state-owned fund, representing another manifestation of Article 16 of 
the BSL.254 Start-ups like iSpace have also secured contracts from NASA to design the 
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Artemis-7 lander, reinforcing the strong economic ties between Japan and its 
closest ally.255  
As seen in the United States, a style of commercially-led, “bottom-up” innovation 
has smoothed bureaucratic friction and conserved precious funding for space projects, 
offering a cost-effective alternative to state-led innovation.256 Although Japan’s 
commercial space initiatives have yet to produce this model, they could serve as another 
success of selective industrial promotion, which has served Japan well historically. 
Additionally, Japan could take the early strides towards the network-centric system Moltz 
describes. However, Japan’s technocratic history stands as a formidable obstacle to a 
potential network-driven model of U.S. caliber. Despite Japan’s steps towards empowering 
the private sector in space-related activity, JAXA’s heavy role in directing space activity 
and the relative weakness of Japan’s space industry preclude it from reaching the United 
States’ degree of network-based innovation. Nonetheless, China is much less likely to 
adopt this model than Japan, offering Tokyo a promising glimmer of hope in its commercial 
battle with the Chinese commercial space industry.257 Should its industrial strategy 
succeed, Japan could at least progress toward this outcome, improving efficiency and 
possibly pulling ahead of China in the process.  
3. Civil 
Japan has had to fight to retain its status as the leading space power and 
technological leader in Asia in light of China’s contemporary space achievements. Once 
the BSL was passed, Japan had a concrete series of guidelines that outlined the new role of 
Japan’s space administration amidst rising competition from China. These objectives 
shaped the role of Japan’s civil space agency and continue to influence Japan’s space power 
strategy, primarily in the use of soft-space power. While many of the resolutions in the 
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BSL reiterated the need for ongoing activity such as “Improvement of the Lives of the 
Citizenry” and the “Advancement of Industries,” the BSL also reformed the internal 
workings of Japan’s civil space bureaucracy and directed Japan’s space diplomacy strategy 
abroad.258 
Japan’s space bureaucracy received renewed support from the government at large 
following the passing of the BSL. Collectively, the actions constituted by the BSL defined 
the scope of Japan’s space activity within a competitive framework following China’s 
achievements in space. First, the BSL declared that the Cabinet would establish the 
Strategic Headquarters for Space Development, an administration tasked with carrying out 
the Basic Space Plan; this Plan outlined specific commercial, civil, and security-related 
strategic objectives and their basis for execution.259 Second, the BSL detailed the 
requirements of the state in space policy. One such requirement is that the state must 
strengthen coordination among local governments, universities, private corporations, and 
other actors to more effectively achieve these objectives, outlined in Article 10.260 Last, 
the BSL emphasized the ongoing need to promote ongoing objectives such as 
environmental preservation, educational advancement, and the peaceful use of space.  
The BSL also shaped the international functions of Japan’s civil space program in 
the new competitive context. Throughout the PPR era of Japan’s space program, projects 
such as the previously mentioned Halley’s Comet mission and development of the ISS 
provided Japan’s space bureaucracy with both experience in multilateral space projects and 
diplomatic capital it could use to attain future objectives. While Japan’s civil space 
program has historically worked with international partners, the BSL outlined concrete 
objectives and policies for space-related diplomacy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
(MFA) Official Space Diplomatic Policy outlines specific areas of focus for international 
cooperation in accordance with Article 6 of the BSL: “international rulemaking for the 
utilization of space,” “promoting international cooperation regarding space,” and “ensuring 
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space security.”261 While Japan faces many geopolitical security risks, it also emphasizes 
the need to address global threats among its international partners to promote “human 
security.”262 Threats to human security include risks posed by space debris and natural 
disasters.263 The official MFA policy aims to combat these problems by engaging in 
outreach measures to garner support for a rules-based space order.  
Japan’s diplomatic outreach strategy aims to counter China’s regional influence by 
fostering strong relations with other space-faring nations. While evidence of space-related 
diplomatic cooperation between Japan and the United States is plentiful,264 Japan’s space 
program especially embraces diplomacy with nations across the Asia-Pacific concerned 
with China’s regional ambitions. Shared concerns over China’s quest for hegemony have 
brought Japan and India closer than ever before. Japan and India held their first 
comprehensive space dialogue in March of 2019.265 The dialogue brought JAXA and 
ISRO officials together to discuss a range of important topics: such topics include “space 
security, bilateral cooperation…their space industries, global navigation satellite [systems, 
SSA,] space-related norms and other areas of mutual interest.”266 This type of exchange is 
evidence of Japan’s bilateral measures to counter China’s rise, as both India and Japan are 
competing fiercely to promote their technological merit. This space summit represents a 
willingness to externally balance against China and could serve as a foundation for bilateral 
security-related projects in the future.  
The unprecedented use of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
funding to promote Vietnam’s space program is especially noteworthy, given the clear 
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effort towards external balancing this initiative represents. In this regard, Japan’s space-
related assistance to its partners promotes not only its diplomatic aim of human security, 
but also its geopolitical goal of preserving national security amidst China’s rise. In 2011, 
Japan offered loans of approximately 35–40 billion yen (JPY) to Vietnam.267 This instance 
marked the first time Japan had utilized ODA funding to promote an international space 
program.268 By 2015, Japan and Vietnam had collectively invested 54 billion JPY in the 
Vietnam Space Center Project (VNSC).269 While the strategic calculation by Japan to 
invest mass amounts of capital into Vietnam’s young space program is certainly conducive 
towards promoting human-and-space security, the geopolitical significance of and 
motivation for this bilateral cooperation cannot be ignored. By leveraging its status as a 
leader in space technology, Japan can not only develop political capital with emerging 
regional space powers, but also influence these states to balance against China through 
cooperation on dual-use projects like the previously mentioned earth observation satellites.  
Japan’s success through APRSAF remains conducive to Japan’s emphasis on space 
diplomacy by promoting human security, and the forum has become a much greater success 
than China’s alternative organization. Japan’s diplomatic competition with China has 
continued into the new millennium, evident in the foundation of the Asia Pacific Space 
Cooperation Organization (APSCO) in 2008 from the former AP-MCSTA.270 One 
contributing factor to the disparity between the two organizations’ participation is China’s 
“heavy hand” in cooperative settings.271 Geopolitical considerations and the disparate 
expertise of the organizations’ contributing parties have also allowed APRSAF to possess 
a greater deal of space-based diplomatic outreach over APSCO. Participation in APRSAF 
has increased substantially since the initial conference in 1993, having brought together 
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385 organizations from 29 countries and 9 international organizations at the 2018 
forum.272 In comparison, APSCO currently only brings together eight member states.273 
While most states are active in APRSAF vice APSCO, some elect to contribute to both 
institutions, namely Pakistan, Turkey, Mongolia, and China itself. APRSAF’s success as 
an annual forum has significantly promoted Japan’s interests in space among its growing 
array of participants. However, the scale of China’s SIC within BRI poses a significant 
challenge to Japan’s success in regional space diplomacy. While APSCO remains in 
APRSAF’s shadow, the SIC offers member-nations access to Chinese space services as 
part of a larger investment in domestic infrastructure. Without the narrower, space-specific 
requirements of APSCO, the SIC could undercut Japan’s leadership in regional space 
diplomacy.  
Japan’s space strategy also seeks to constrain China’s space behavior through 
international institutions. By utilizing its diplomatic clout and status as a major space power 
at the UN, Japan can effectively represent the interests of states which stand to benefit from 
Japan’s proposed space norms at both the regional and international levels. Juxtaposed with 
China’s actions which promote instability, like its 2007 ASAT launch, Japan promotes 
norms and institutional constraints which enhance its image as a responsible leader in 
space.274 Within the UN, Japan has most notably contributed to the peaceful use of space 
through its efforts as part of UN-COPUOS.275 JAXA also collaborates with UNOOSA on 
a variety of projects, such as deploying cube satellites from the Japan-owned Kibo module 
of the ISS.276 The Kibo module is currently the only section of the ISS that can deploy 
cube satellites, providing Japan with a point of leverage and specialized expertise on the 
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international stage.277 Additionally, Japan was the only nation to invoke the Outer Space 
Treaty (OST) following China’s ASAT test, seeking to constrain its rival’s behavior 
through an internationally recognized accord.278 Collectively, these efforts represent the 
targeted scope of Japan’s space diplomacy strategy, as it works through bilateral, regional 
multilateral institutions, large-scale international organizations, and treaties in pursuit of 
its strategic aims.  
Japan has continued its space exploration missions to promote techno-nationalism 
and supplement its “human security” approach to space diplomacy. By investing in projects 
dedicated to space science, Japan has been able to largely recover from the damage to 
national prestige in space following Shenzhou V and other Chinese projects.279 In 2009, 
Japan launched GOSAT, a platform meant to gather data on the relationship between 
greenhouse gasses and climate change.280 JAXA also launched the Venus climate orbiter 
Akatsuki in 2010 which collects data on the planet’s extreme climate and weather 
patterns.281 Japan’s recent accomplishments in space exploration also include the ongoing 
asteroid mission, Hayabusa II,282 which is building upon the successes of its predecessor 
launched in 2003, Hayabusa I,283 by conducting tests and bringing back samples gathered 
from the asteroid’s surface.284 Japan also launched GOSAT II in 2018, a more precise and 
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capable successor to GOSAT.285 The GOSAT and Hayabusa class missions promote 
JAXA’s image as a leader in space science and an organization dedicated to promoting 
human security to the benefit of all.  
Significant achievements could be just over the horizon for JAXA in its quest to 
explore the universe and compete with China’s high-profile missions. Japan is planning to 
launch a manned mission to the moon and will begin designing an appropriate lunar lander 
in 2020.286 A successful manned mission to the moon would have significant implications 
for perceptions of Japan’s technological capabilities. Most notably, such a mission would 
challenge China’s ambition to be viewed as the dominant technological power in Asia, 
especially following China’s recent mission on the dark side of the moon. An unmanned 
mission to Mars’s two moons, Phobos and Deimos, which will bring back materials from 
the surface, is also in the works.287 While China has beaten Japan to some achievements 
in space such as independent manned spaceflight, and will continue to chart out other firsts 
based on current projections,288 Japan remains committed to its planned mission sets and 
charting its own unique path of firsts in the region and the solar system.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Shifts in Japan’s space strategy aim to comprehensively address the rising threat 
presented by China’s ascension as a major space power. Although Japan’s strategy has 
evolved gradually in response to commercial and security-related obstacles, the shift from 
a solely peaceful policy to a militarized, comprehensive approach is best outlined in the 
BSL. In the midst of China’s rise, Japan’s space strategy strengthens the nation’s security 
apparatus by employing militarized space assets for intelligence collecting, adopting a 
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comprehensive BMD system, and fostering strong working relationships between the 
civilian space bureaucracy and the MoD. These trends reinforce Japan’s balancing with the 
United States against China and are clearly seen in the high degree of security-driven space 
cooperation. As Japan continues to undergo a process of military normalization, the 
increasing integration with the United States in the security domain will help ease its fear 
of abandonment by its American ally while building its own capacity. This two-pronged 
approach to security allows Japan to externally balance with the United States against 
China while also enhancing its own capabilities. While ongoing cooperation with the 
United States remains a top priority, Japan’s indigenous achievements signify the country’s 
dedication to strengthening the alliance through its own capabilities. 
From a soft power perspective, Japan’s diplomatic strategy aims to counter China’s 
growing regional influence among other concerned states by promoting mutually beneficial 
projects and institutional norms. Commercially, Japan hopes to reinforce this approach by 
securing a larger share of the launch services market and taking the early steps toward the 
network-driven style of space-related innovation like that seen in the United States. 
Although Japan faces intense competition from its mainland rival, it has postured itself 
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IV. VIETNAM 
Vietnam’s history in space differs from that of India and Japan. Having only 
recently established an independent space agency, Vietnam is limited in its space-related 
capabilities and expertise. However, despite its relative inexperience, Vietnam’s 
establishment of an applications-based space program has altered its strategic outlook and 
opportunities in the midst of China’s rise. As relations between China and Vietnam remain 
contentious, complicated by a history of border disputes and the ongoing crisis in the South 
China Sea, the diplomatic and security-related opportunities provided by Vietnam’s space 
program help it externally balance against China. Vietnam is also internally balancing 
against China by enhancing its own technological capabilities. This chapter examines 
Vietnam’s developing space power strategy and how it has departed from its intended 
civilian-space orientation in response to China’s hegemonic ambitions. It begins with a 
brief history of Vietnam’s history in space, followed by detailed analysis of the country’s 
current military, commercial, and civil approaches to the space domain. The chapter 
concludes by summarizing the previous sections’ key findings. 
A. HISTORY OF VIETNAM’S SPACE PROGRAM 
Vietnam is both a late-developing nation and a late space power. After breaking 
free of Japanese occupation and French colonial rule, Vietnam was unable to concentrate 
its resources toward a space program, as it was embroiled in a civil war with the U.S.-
backed South and the consequent post-war reconstruction and consolidation efforts. 
Vietnam’s border war with China, beginning in 1979, further distracted national attention 
away from space. While China had formerly supported North Vietnam during the war 
against its southern counterpart and the United States, Hanoi’s increasingly close ties with 
the Soviet Union and its invasion of Cambodia spurred a Chinese military response, 
complicating bilateral relations.289  
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However, Vietnam participated in the Soviet Intercosmos program in fellowship 
with the Warsaw Pact in 1980, promoting relations with Moscow and national pride after 
decades of domestic instability. Pham Tuan, a fighter pilot during the Vietnam War, rode 
aboard Soyuz 37 to the Salyut 6 space station, spending just over a week in space.290 
Following Tuan’s return to Earth and Vietnam’s accession to UN-COPUOS, Vietnam 
began using UN Development Program satellite data, but still did not maintain any assets 
in space of its own.291 Following the Doi Moi reforms, Vietnam’s initiatives to promote 
economic liberalization starting in the mid-1980s, Vietnam entered a period of explosive 
economic growth. This opening of Vietnam’s economy provided it with the capital 
necessary to sustain its own satellite program, making a national space program feasible 
for the first time.292 
In 1995, Vietnam commenced the early pre-development stages of the VINASAT 
project.293 According to American space and security analyst Robert Harding, “As a 
communications platform, Vinasat-1 was intended to give Vietnam telecommunications 
autonomy and free up an estimated US$10–15 million in annual leasing fees that was 
previously paid for access to other countries’ telecom  satellites.”294 In 2002, the 
Vietnamese government officially commissioned the development of the VINASAT-1 
program.295 Vietnam placed the program under the oversight of the state-owned 
telecommunications company Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group (VNPT),296 
conducive with the goal of unifying the country’s rural and urban demographics.  
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Vietnam remained committed to a development-minded space program, even in the 
wake of China’s emergence as a formidable regional space power. In 2006, Vietnam 
implemented the Master Plan for Space Technology Development of Vietnam up to 2020, 
a series of six guidelines for the nation’s approach to space.297 The Master Plan focused 
on developing the framework and legal guidelines for space policy, space infrastructure, 
technical expertise, and manufacturing capability, and emphasized self-development and 
satellite applications.298 Vietnam also signed an MoU in space science and applications 
with JAXA, the space agency which would become Vietnam’s most generous benefactor 
in the years to come.299 Furthermore, in 2007, the Space Technology Institute was 
established to produce small satellites to fulfill the Master Plan.300 Japan came to 
Vietnam’s aid in developing and launching these microsatellites, but not before the 
VINASAT program was complete. 
Years of planning came to fruition in the late 2000s. VINASAT-1 was successfully 
launched from the Guiana Space Center in April 2008 and was transferred to the 
Vietnamese government’s control four months later.301 According to Harding, in order to 
manage this and future satellites, Vietnam built two control stations in the Hay Tay and 
Binh Duong provinces.302 The new decade also commenced with the formal establishment 
of the Vietnam National Satellite Center in 2011.303 The Vietnam National Satellite Center 
was later rebranded as the Vietnam National Space Center (VNSC), the country’s official 
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independent space agency.304 The VNSC was funded through an ODA loan from Japan.305 
Then in May 2012, another Vietnamese communications satellite, VINASAT-2, was placed 
into orbit from the Guiana Space Center.306 VINASAT-2 was also overseen by the VNPT 
and manufactured by Lockheed Martin.307 While it had taken four months for Lockheed 
to transfer control of VINASAT-1 to Vietnam, it only took two months for its successor, 
due to Vietnam’s evolving space-related capabilities.308 VNSC’s investments in the 
VINASAT class communication satellites and other spacecraft have improved the well-
being of Vietnamese society in a number of ways. The VINASAT program has had a 
remarkable impact on the telecommunications industry and development of rural 
communities under the oversight of VNPT. VINASAT-1 provided Vietnam with the ability 
to provide the entirety of its rural population telephone and television services,309 and 
VINASAT-2 provided even more commercial bandwidth amidst the maxing out of 
VINASAT-1’s near 2012.310 
Vietnam’s space power strategy was forced to adapt to the shifting regional balance 
of power following the completion of the VINASAT program. China’s regional ambitions, 
namely those in the South China Sea, directly threatened Vietnam’s strategic interests in 
the early 2010s. The historical legacy of the Sino-Vietnamese border dispute during the 
Cold-War intensified as a result of this Chinese territorial assertiveness. According to 
Joshua Kurlantzick, a Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council of Foreign Relations, 
China began to more aggressively enforce claims to 90% of the South China Sea during 
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this time. 311 He claims that China’s posturing forced Vietnam to respond with in-kind 
territorial assertiveness. According to security analysts Zachary Abuza and Nguyen Nhat 
Anh, this Chinese assertiveness has caught Vietnam off guard, leaving it to invest quickly 
in a variety of ISR assets, such as earth-observation satellites and surveillance drones.312 
Given the disparity of power between Vietnam and China, Vietnam pursued remote-
sensing satellites which provided both civilian and military utility. These responses 
followed a series of escalating incidents in 2012, when China detained Vietnamese 
fishermen near the Paracel islands and conducted illegal fishing operations by the 
Scarborough Shoal.313 Vietnam responded with legislation reiterating sovereignty over the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands,314 but China’s aggressive island-building campaign has only 
intensified in the aftermath of this declaration. 
Vietnam pursued increasingly close ties with Japan amidst this backdrop. Prior to 
escalating tensions in the South China Sea, the security-related implications of cooperation 
between Vietnam and Japan in the space domain were modest at best. Up until this period, 
bilateral cooperation between the two powers was limited to development-oriented projects 
aligned with Vietnam’s civilian-minded space power strategy. However, the shared 
security threat posed by China increased the kinds of assistance JAXA provided to 
Vietnam. While Vietnam continued its cooperation with other established space powers, 
the relationship with Japan proved to be in a tier of its own. As part of the security-driven 
expansion of cooperation, Japan facilitated the launch of most of Vietnam’s earth 
observation satellites, the construction of Vietnam’s major space infrastructure, and the 
early stages of indigenous capability.  
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VNREDSAT-1 was Vietnam’s first successful earth observation platform launched 
amidst escalating tensions with China. VNREDSat-1, a remote-sensing satellite largely 
funded by French ODA, was launched in 2013 following the failed F-1 project.315 
According to the Deputy Prime Minister, Nguyen Thien Nhan, VNREDSat-1 gave Vietnam 
the capability to process imagery of the entirety of the country without external 
assistance.316 Japan launched PicoDragon, an imaging satellite produced with Japanese 
assistance, and deployed it from the ISS this same year.317 The project has been described 
by the Vietnam National Space Center as a “significant milestone for the Made in Vietnam 
satellite’s strategy,” as it was the first satellite produced entirely in-country; the only work 
done in Japan was a series of prelaunch tests.318  
Vietnam’s Japanese ODA-financed construction plans came to fruition in the mid-
late 2010s as well. The Center of Human Resource Development in Space Technology in 
Hanoi was completed in 2016, the Nha Trang Observatory was finished in 2017, and the 
long-awaited Space Center in Hoa Lac High Tech Park was opened in Hanoi in 2018.319 
Most recently, MicroDragon, a microsatellite intended for remote sensing over Vietnam’s 
coastal areas, was launched in January of 2019 onboard JAXA’s Epsilon launcher.320 
VNSC continues to make progress in other related projects with Japan that carry 
implications for regional security. The LOTUSAT-1 and LOTUSAT-2, a pair of disaster 
monitoring satellites designed in Japan and built by Vietnam, are expected to launch in 
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2019 and 2020, respectively.321 These satellites are based on Japan’s ASNARO-2 SAR 
platform,322 and will ultimately provide Vietnam valuable SAR-derived imagery.323 This 
is especially significant given the regional climate and weather patterns, as SAR 
technology is able to produce clear images even in inclement weather and darkness.324  
Vietnam’s progress in space since the turn of the millennium is truly remarkable, 
having possessed no space assets in 2000, to utilizing a multifaceted array of satellites and 
research centers less than two decades later. While Japan has certainly played a large role 
in facilitating these achievements, Vietnam’s government remains committed to providing 
as much domestic support as possible. Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc recently declared 
that the government would “offer all possible support to Vietnamese scientists and 
engineers to develop space technology” in pursuit of “space sovereignty” and high-level 
satellite engineering capabilities.325  
 India has also contributed to Vietnamese space developments. ISRO announced 
that it would build a satellite data receiving station in Ho Chi Minh City, one which would 
grant Vietnam access to imagery over the South China Sea from India’s proven earth 
observation satellites.326 This strategic chess move by India, announced in 2016, has been 
described as a form of “quid pro quo” by an anonymous Indian government official, who 
declared that the center will “enable Vietnam to receive IRS pictures directly, that is, 
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without asking India… [including] parts of China of interest to Vietnam.”327 While the 
station could certainly serve civilian purposes, it also reflects the growing military potential 
for Vietnam’s space program in light of the threat from China. 
B. CONTEMPORARY SHIFTS IN SPACE STRATEGY 
1. Military 
Vietnam’s dedication to preserving sovereignty in the face of China’s aggression 
in the early 2010s has driven the militarization of its traditionally development-minded 
space program. Although Vietnam does not maintain any military-specific space assets, it 
has employed its existing civil assets to enhance national security through their dual-use 
capabilities. In general, the ambiguity surrounding dual-use technologies is clarified by a 
nation’s policy on how to employ them. Vietnam’s policy has gradually shifted to 
incorporate security applications and military utility amidst China’s growing challenge to 
Vietnam’s territorial sovereignty. While China’s Nine-Dash line claims have fueled 
concerns among many regional states, destabilizing incidents in the region have especially 
fueled Hanoi’s interest in advanced maritime and ISR assets to protect its sovereignty. 
While Vietnam’s space-based ISR assets remain administered by the civilian-
bureaucracy, not the Vietnamese military, the military has garnered more influence over 
national space policy as regional threats have evolved. According to Singaporean security 
analyst Collin Koh Swee Lean, the Chairman of the National Research Program on Space 
Science and Technology Nguyen Khoa Son argued in 2008 that “if we [Vietnam] have our 
own satellite, we can respond more promptly to natural disasters and be more active in 
defense and security activities.”328 However, VNPT’s VINASAT-1 was Vietnam’s only 
asset in orbit by the end of 2008 and was devoted exclusively to civilian use. Then, in 2013, 
following Vietnam’s declaration of ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands and in the 
run-up to launching VNREDSat-1, Prime Minster Nguyen Tan Dung expanded the 
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composition of the Vietnam Space Committee, an institution devoted to fulfilling the 
Master Plan through 2020, to include representatives from the Ministry of Defense.329 
Vietnam’s shift from rhetoric to concrete institutional shifts has coincided with evolutions 
in its technical capacity, illustrating a trend of increased willingness to engage in military-
space activity as threats increase. The Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and the 
Environment, Nguyen Thai Lai, provided further evidence of a shifting policy, as he 
declared that VNREDSat-1 allows Vietnam to preserve sovereignty over its contiguous and 
maritime territorial possessions.330  
Given Vietnam’s increasing technical capabilities and shift in space-security 
rhetoric, a consensus has emerged that Vietnam is utilizing its civil satellites to conduct 
ISR operations over the South China Sea in a departure from historical norms. According 
to Koh, despite the relatively less precise resolution VNREDSat-1 provides compared to 
international competitors, it carries significant ISR potential nonetheless.331 Koh also 
argues that as Vietnam progresses towards larger, more capable satellites like the planned 
LOTUSAT series, its ISR capabilities over the South China Sea will continue to converge 
with those of other established space powers. Furthermore, the leader of the Natural 
Remote Sensing Department, Nguyen Xuan Lam, explained how the VNREDSat-1 serves 
in “monitoring offshore key waters and islands with remote sensing technology,” providing 
further evidence of the nation’s transition to security applications of space technology.332 
However, Vietnam’s military space strategy would not be sustainable by relying 
solely on dual-use assets like VNREDSat-1. Part of the challenge facing Vietnam’s ISR 
aspirations is that its space-based assets must cater to both geopolitical and natural security 
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threats such as typhoons, landslides, and flooding. Without specifically military dedicated 
assets in space, Vietnam will not be able to achieve the degree of ISR capability to fully 
monitor increasing Chinese military activity on its own. The recent trend toward accepting 
internationally-based assistance in earth observation represents part of a two-track strategy 
to solve this problem.333 Such collaboration could fill current gaps in capability and 
capacity in the short term, while allowing Vietnam time to develop more advanced 
surveillance platforms for use in the long term.334 
India’s satellite center in Vietnam marks an unprecedented form of security 
assistance by the South Asian power. This center is India’s only satellite station which 
offers data accessibility to the host-nation, a decision motivated by India’s increasing 
security concerns fueled by China’s rise and India’s increasing military ties with 
Vietnam.335 According to ISRO official Deviprasad Karnik, in addition to providing 
Vietnam high resolution imagery from a well-respected earth-observation constellation, 
India benefits from the expanded coverage provided by a center stationed in Vietnam,336 
representing a continuation of their increased bilateral military cooperation into space. 
Despite the new center’s description as a civilian system by both India and Vietnam, their 
increasingly aligned interests makes it highly likely that it will be used for military ISR 
operations.  
Considering the space-related assistance from foreign powers and shared 
geopolitical interests, it can be deduced that Vietnam is externally balancing with Japan 
against China given China’s increasingly threatening position to Vietnamese interests in 
Southeast Asia. The same can be said for India, as India has cooperated with Vietnam by 
facilitating both space-surveillance projects and conventional military assistance.337 The 
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space-based aspects of these relationships confirm the external-balancing effort by 
Vietnam to counter China through bilateral cooperation. 
2. Commercial 
Although Vietnam aspires to compete in the global space economy, its space 
program has yet to achieve the requisite domestic capacity, precluding commercial 
competition with China. While Vietnam’s investments in space assets have yielded 
commercial utility in a variety of domestic industries, Vietnam’s commercial space 
interests are limited to a narrow range of services. Vietnam has marketed its remote-sensing 
images to compete with Thailand, the second of the only two Southeast Asian countries to 
compete in this sector of the space economy.338 However, the absence of a rocketry 
program precludes the development of a launch services industry, which would require 
significant expertise and capital investment. Furthermore, despite Vietnam’s standing 
among the most tech-friendly of Southeast Asian nations, possessing over 3,000 start-
ups,339 the business climate and difficulties in finding qualified personnel hinder 
Vietnam’s commercial space development.  
3. Civil 
Vietnam’s civil space program has been the focal point of the nation’s 
achievements in space. It has not only accomplished many of the development-oriented 
objectives it was intended to but has also paved the way for the previously mentioned 
security-related capabilities to counter China’s regional activity. Emphasizing economic 
development, Vietnam has chosen to pursue solely communications and remote-sensing 
satellites to better integrate the rural population, enhance agricultural production, and 
mitigate the effects of natural disasters. With regard to space diplomacy, Vietnam relies 
most heavily on bilateral cooperation. Vietnam has benefitted from these partnerships not 
only by working with more experienced space powers, promoting domestic capacity in the 
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space domain, but also by strengthening relations with larger powers to promote external 
balancing. Harding identifies bilateral cooperation as one of the three key pillars of 
Vietnam’s space strategy, alongside space applications and satellite control.340 Not 
surprisingly, much of the cooperation between VNSC and international space agencies 
aims to bolster Vietnamese proficiency in the two latter fields.  
Japan has emerged as Vietnam’s most significant patron in space from both a 
diplomatic and geopolitical perspective, as the regional power’s generosity has facilitated 
nearly all of Vietnam’s major achievements in space. While Japan has certainly reaped 
diplomatic capital from its development-oriented assistance to Vietnam, promoting its own 
image among regional states and Vietnam’s capacity to address humanitarian crises, the 
JAXA-VNSC relationship is best analyzed through a realist lens. Japan’s generous 
investments in VNSC’s human capital, technical capacity, and dual-use spacecraft 
constitute a direct effort to enhance Japanese-Vietnamese relations in the face of a rising 
China. The special relationship between JAXA-VNSC has also laid a firm foundation for 
future security-related cooperation between Japan and Vietnam in other domains. 
Having benefitted from American technology transfers and cooperation during its 
early years as a spacefaring nation, Japan understands how to best help Vietnam achieve 
its space-related objectives. Although the two nations may not appear to be the most likely 
security-partners, especially given the legacy of Japanese occupation during World War II, 
their shared concern over China’s regional ambitions has produced a mutually beneficial 
relationship between the two nations. Following the 2006 MoU between JAXA and the 
Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology (VAST), the bilateral cooperation between 
Vietnam and Japan increased in both scale and scope. In 2015, VAST, Vietnam’s Water 
Resources Department, and JAXA signed another MoU to monitor and alleviate natural 
disasters.341 The arrangement facilitated data sharing in the aftermath of natural disasters, 
the creation of an imagery database, the enhancement of Vietnam’s capability to utilize 
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space-based earth observation capabilities, and the formation of domestic programs with 
support from JAXA.342 The partner nations reached yet another agreement in 2017 that 
built upon the framework from the 2015 MoU. This agreement promoted the DataCube 
database, a space-derived information database like that mentioned in the 2015 MoU, 
which is used to monitor the environment in Vietnam.343 This assistance would come from 
JAXA’s high-resolution ScanSAR ALOS-2 satellite which would store images of Vietnam 
in the aforementioned database.344 Currently, to alleviate the ongoing shortage of space 
experts in Vietnam, VNSC is funding 50 staff members to study satellite engineering in 
Japan, and 32 more to study technical applications.345 The Aerospace Application Center 
is also expected to open in Ho Chi Minh City in 2020.346 Even as Vietnam attains more 
independent space capabilities, based upon other notable examples of bilateral space 
cooperation between asymmetric space powers, the JAXA-VNSC relationship is unlikely 
to slow. 
Cooperation at the multilateral level is another element of Vietnam’s approach to 
space diplomacy. By participating in Japan’s APRSAF, Vietnam has effectively 
coordinated with other notable space powers, enhancing its bilateral relations with similar 
China-fearing states. Vietnam has participated in ARPSAF since the 11th session in 
2004347 and has co-hosted the forum with Japan twice. In 2008, Vietnam hosted the 15th 
session with the theme of “Space for Sustainable Development,” and again in 2013 with 
the theme of “Values from Space: 20 Years of Asia-Pacific Experiences.”348 While the 
former theme is clearly aligned with Vietnam’s initial space-related objectives, at the latter 
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session, Vietnam introduced a new workshop devoted entirely to cooperation, consisting 
of six proposals for potential areas of partnership.349 This addition to the agenda is 
representative of both Vietnam’s desire to enhance regional cooperation towards mutually 
beneficial objectives in space and to take advantage of its agenda-setting power when 
provided the opportunity. Vietnam also stands to benefit from SIC as part of BRI. However, 
while Vietnam can certainly benefit from some of the services SIC promises to provide, it 
will likely limit growing dependent on these offerings given the conflicting security 
interests with China. 
Vietnam has certainly benefitted from its involvement in APRSAF, but its 
membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by contrast, has 
provided little utility. This is largely because of ASEAN’s slow bureaucratic processes, its 
mandate for consensus, and its lack of collective expertise in space. The “ASEAN way” is 
a slow, deliberative process that has admittedly achieved political objectives after extended 
debate, but given the more pressing issues on the organization’s agenda, major 
achievements for the association in space lie far in the future.350 Additionally, given the 
organization’s emphasis on collective agreement, any potential joint missions would be 
subject to a long development phase with numerous revisions until all members are 
satisfied with the final product. Security projects meant to counter China would be 
especially scrutinized, given the member-states’ many different perceptions of China. The 
majority of ASEAN’s membership is also relatively inexperienced in space.351  
Furthermore, as Moltz explains, “current forms of regional cooperation fit models of 
political and economic ‘influence building’ and are relatively limited, rather than fitting 
the ESA model of significant cooperation in major joint space ventures among peers.”352 
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While ASEAN’s Sub-Committee on Space Technology and Applications has some 
missions planned with external partners, including China, as well as with the Southeast 
Asia Astronomy Network, the details of these arrangements are vague and could easily fail 
to produce an outcome.353 Considering these factors, in pursuit of its own space security, 
Vietnam is best suited avoiding dependence on ASEAN. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Vietnam is an up and coming space power in Southeast Asia. Though it remains far 
behind the regional powerhouses like China, India, and Japan, it has certainly benefitted 
from Japanese assistance and technology transfers to leapfrog over its peer-level 
competitors. Vietnam has successfully exploited the new avenues for external balancing 
provided by its space program by cooperating with Japan, converging with more 
established space powers much more quickly than it would without external assistance 
while enhancing national security. Though not yet able to compete in the commercial space 
sector, Vietnam has certainly made significant strides in space since Phan Tuam rode 
aboard a Soviet spacecraft almost 40 years ago. Now with a formal organizational structure 
and part of a larger institutional framework, VNSC oversees an evolving array of dual-use 
spacecraft conducive with national efforts on both the civilian and military sides of the 
spectrum. As China and Vietnam continue to stand off in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s 
diplomatic and security-focused relationships with developed space powers will enhance 
its ability to meaningfully compete against a much more powerful rising China.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined three Asian states’ space-strategic responses to China’s 
rise as a multifaceted space power. Evidence from the case studies indicates that India, 
Japan, and Vietnam have all leveraged their space capabilities to balance against China, 
aligning with the realist framework and supporting the hypothesis proposed in Chapter I. 
Interestingly, in addition to balancing internally, the three countries have also responded 
to the threat from China by externally balancing with each other. This phenomenon 
demonstrates a partial desire to overcome the competitive dynamics of space power 
competition in Asia to address the security threat from China. The shift among previously 
exclusively peaceful Asian space programs to incorporate military space applications is 
especially noteworthy, as weaponized and militarized space posturing marks a stark 
departure from historical tendencies. The countries’ revamped commercial and civil space 
dynamics also signify a newfound motivation to compete with China’s soft power strategy. 
These trends have significant implications for the United States’ role in preserving regional 
stability. U.S. policy should accordingly approach these countries’ developments in space 
as opportunities to expand American leadership in the region. This chapter will prescribe 
recommendations for U.S. space policy in the region, following comparative analysis of 
the case studies’ strategic shifts. The thesis will conclude by summarizing key themes and 
suggesting avenues for future research. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
As described in the previous chapters, Japan, India, and Vietnam previously 
neglected the potential military utility of their space programs in favor of fulfilling civil 
ambitions. This thesis finds that from a military-space perspective, Asian nations are 
orbiting military-dedicated and dual-use civilian ISR satellites to address China’s growing 
military presence in the region (see Table 3). India and Japan have also launched satellite 
navigation constellations and military-dedicated communications satellites to promote the 
readiness of their forces. By supplementing their terrestrial forces with militarized space 
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assets, these countries are better prepared to engage China as its military becomes more 
active in the Indo-Pacific region. 
Table 3. Comparative Military-Space Responses 
 INDIA JAPAN VIETNAM 
ISR SATELLITES X X X 
BUREAUCRATIC 
REORGANIZATION 
X X X 
REVISED 
DOCTRINE 




X X  
COMMUNICATIONS 
SATELLITES 
X X  
ASAT WEAPON X   
 
Furthermore, the three countries’ militaries have benefitted from organizational 
restructuring and revised doctrine. By incorporating space as a warfare domain in joint 
military doctrine, reorganizing existing institutions, and facilitating coordination between 
civilian and military space bureaucracies, the countries have enhanced their militaries’ 
organizational capacity to confront China across the region. India stands as an outlier 
because of its weaponized ASAT deterrent. As explained in Chapter II, by repurposing its 
existing BMD program, India has matched China’s demonstrated ASAT capability in-kind, 
signaling a strong commitment to national defense in the wake of China’s weaponization 
of space. 
From a commercial perspective, for the time being, India and Japan have etched 
out their own respective comparative advantages to compete with China in the global 
launch services industry. However, as previously mentioned, in each of these cases, the 
upcoming Long March 5, 6, and 7 could ultimately erode these advantages over the long 
term. India’s and Japan’s inclinations to privatize elements of their launch services 
programs are a proactive response to this prospect, offering sustainability and efficiency in 
the long term while also offering a politically salient contrast to the subsidized, state-run 
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model employed by China. The pragmatic motive to lower production costs for profit alone 
certainly plays a role in these decisions. However, the potential for diplomatic capital 
provided by a highly competitive launch services industry is another incentive for India’s 
and Japan’s embrace of privatization. By offering efficient launches to developing space 
powers, India and Japan can build strong relationships with the many nations looking to 
capitalize on the commercial utility offered in space. This commercial outreach undercuts 
similar soft power efforts by China and is enhanced by the potential efficiency offered by 
contributions from Japan’s and India’s private sectors.  
India and Japan have also institutionalized support for their rising commercial space 
start-ups. While China’s commercial space actors have attracted a significant amount of 
investment, Japan’s state-sanctioned fund constitutes a meaningful competitive response, 
currently standing larger than the whole of China’s commercial space investment.354 
Additionally, India’s space-related incubators will enhance the nation’s competitiveness, 
especially in the battle between Make in India and Digital India versus Made in China 
2025. Although the rise of commercial start-ups in Japan and India are welcome 
developments, given the historical legacy of state intervention in the economy, it is unlikely 
that these two countries will be able to reap the benefits of the “netocracy” conceptualized 
by Moltz to the same extent as the United States.355 The same can be said for Vietnam. 
However, if Vietnam is to compete with China in the global space economy, it is best suited 
finding a niche market in the commercial space industry given the immense head start taken 
by the region’s leading space powers. 
In the civil space arena, these countries’ strategic shifts signal a strong willingness 
to collaborate with foreign partners in an expanding array of arrangements. Given that 
strategic competition has acted as one of the primary drivers of space-based cooperation 
among regional states,356 the increase in multilateral civil-space cooperation is 
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unsurprising. However, the increase in regional participation in APRSAF indicates states 
are willing to somewhat overcome techno-nationalist competition with each other to focus 
on responding to the threat from China. All three countries remain active in APRSAF and 
have sought to exercise leadership in the organization, demonstrating their commitment to 
shared norms. Despite these accomplishments, China’s inclusion of the SIC as part of BRI 
poses a meaningful response to APRSAF’s success. APRSAF will likely remain a key 
instrument of the three countries’ diplomatic space strategies versus China’s new initiative.  
These countries have each engaged in bilateral cooperation with each other as well. 
The implementation of an annual space dialogue between India and Japan represents each 
state’s recognition of the importance of forming space security partnerships in light of the 
threat from China. India’s mutually beneficial collaboration with Vietnam follows this 
observation as well. However, JAXA’s ongoing support of VNSC stands as an especially 
significant example of bilateral space diplomacy. As a result of Japanese patronage, 
Vietnam has emerged as one of the region’s most capable developing space powers and is 
now able to employ high-quality earth observation technology to protect its sovereignty in 
the presence of Chinese activity in the South China Sea. The JAXA-VNSC model of space 
diplomacy is a successful example of mutually beneficial cooperation and balancing within 
the balance of power framework.  
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The degree of collaboration among these countries in the space domain carries 
significant strategic implications. This cooperation extends across both the civil and 
military aspects of space policy, representing a convergence of strategic calculations 
among the selected countries. As the United States aims to compete with China’s grand 
strategy in the Indo-Pacific, hard and soft space power opportunities should be exploited. 
International relations scholar Stephen Walt argued that alliances are most likely to form 
when states balance against a shared threat.357 Considering the increasing degree of 
collaboration between India and Japan in the space domain, as well as the growing scope 
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of Indian and Japanese cooperation with Vietnam, there is strong support for Walt’s 
argument in the contemporary regional dynamic. While these countries are unlikely to sign 
a formal alliance to counter China’s regional aggression, the alignment of their interests 
still supports the general principle Walt argues. This triangular alignment of interests has 
driven space-related cooperation among the selected countries and constitutes a strategic 
opportunity for the United States, given its shared interest in competing with China. 
C. PRESCRIPTIONS 
As the United States’ regional strategy continues to address Chinese hegemonic 
ambitions, it should take advantage of shifting regional space power strategies to promote 
strong relationships and extend its influence among Asian states. The triangular alignment 
among Japan, India, and Vietnam in the space domain constitutes an unprecedented 
opportunity for American space leadership in the Indo-Pacific. The United States should 
welcome the aligning interests of its partners and allies in the region and support 
multilateral relations in the space domain. As the world’s premier space power, the United 
States should engage partners in the Indo-Pacific in mutually beneficial arrangements 
across the military, commercial, and civil space domains so as to institutionalize regional 
cooperation in the space domain. 
The U.S. military’s expertise in employing militarized space assets provides the 
United States with a unique opportunity amidst the embrace of space militarization by its 
regional partners. By offering military-space applications training to space cadre from 
India, Japan, and Vietnam, the United States can enhance the military-to-military relations 
with regional partners balancing against China. Additionally, the joint development of 
military-space technologies, combined military exercises incorporating space applications, 
and other capacity-building initiatives could go a long way toward promoting 
interoperability with regional nations aligned against China. Such proactive cooperation 
would address the disparity of experience in military-space operations among our partners, 
increasing their ability to deter Chinese regional assertiveness. However, the United States 
should approach the weaponization of space, like that constituted by India’s ASAT 
demonstration, carefully. While U.S. policy should generally be supportive of partner states 
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internally balancing against China, it should also condemn destabilizing activity like 
kinetic ASAT exercises in favor of establishing responsible norms of space behavior, given 
the risks posed by debris in the commons of space.  
Commercially, while the United States has an interest in promoting the 
development of its own commercial space industry, it should also strive to facilitate 
cooperation with partner nations to undermine China’s state-subsidized space services. By 
artificially driving down the prices of its marketed space services, China can undercut other 
commercial vendors to promote its diplomatic relations.358 Allowing American companies 
the freedom to launch on partner nations’ rockets would promote the comparative 
advantage of global launch providers, including those based in the United States. Reducing 
trade barriers in the global space economy would allow the United States and its partners 
to effectively compete with China’s artificially low prices of space exports by reducing 
costs and increasing demand. By swaying vulnerable, cash-poor nations forced to launch 
with China toward efficient offerings from the United States and its partners, the U.S-led 
partnership can enhance relations with regional states at China’s expense. While profit 
motive is certainly a significant factor driving commercial space competition, the 
diplomatic and strategic implications of commercial competition with China present a 
mutually beneficial outcome for the United States and its partners through the 
specialization of launch services and other commercial space offerings. 
From a civil perspective, the United States should increase its bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation with regional space powers. Joint space projects such as Nisar (the 
joint NASA-ISRO earth observation satellite described in Chapter II) not only represent an 
efficient alternative to costly unilateral programs, but also enhance the working 
relationship between NASA and its international colleagues. Furthermore, although 
multilateral cooperation is often inhibited by the collective action problem without 
effective organization and leadership, the United States is well positioned to play this role 
in the region and produce truly remarkable outcomes. Multilateral space exploration and 
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space science missions would signal the convergence of regional states’ interests to 
Beijing. Engagement with APRSAF should continue as well, as the forum’s significance 
in the region will only increase as SIC becomes a more viable instrument of Chinese space 
diplomacy. The United States should also consider the Japan-style ODA approach to 
capacity building in the space domain. Japan’s success in constructively engaging Vietnam 
across a variety of space-related development projects should serve as a model for U.S. 
development policy in the region, especially in the context of Chinese infrastructure 
investments through BRI. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Space power dynamics across Asia have been radically altered as a result of China’s 
ambitions beyond the atmosphere. China’s evolving space power strategy has driven shifts 
in the strategic calculations of its regional adversaries. Asian states have responded to 
China’s rise as a space power by employing military space assets, promoting commercial 
competitiveness, utilizing space diplomacy, and conducting prestigious space science 
missions to promote techno-nationalism. The shifts among India’s, Japan’s, and Vietnam’s 
space power strategies in response to Chinese activity constitute an opportunity for 
American leadership in the Indo-Pacific in the context of the return to great power 
competition. 
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